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1.

INTRODUCTION

The United States-led War on Terror1 has reignited a fierce
normative debate between advocates of the potentially competing
interests of civil rights and national security. On one hand, some
argue that using the broadest measures available to capture and
prosecute alleged terrorists around the world is either advisable or
necessary in order to protect national security.2 Under this view,
the interest in capturing and neutralizing potential threats to
public safety outweighs the interest in protecting the civil and
1 The terms “War on Terror” or “war on terrorism” are used in the 2002 U.S.
National Security Strategy to define the current U.S.-led set of military campaigns
relating to combating terrorism. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Introduction, 27, 30, 31 (2002), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf
[hereinafter
2002
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. As the term “War on Terror” is the most
commonly used, this Comment will use that term throughout.
2 See, e.g., Ashcroft Eager to Expand Police Powers, NEWSMAX.COM WIRES, Oct.
26,
2001,
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/25
/160238.shtml (quoting then Attorney General John Ashcroft: “Let the terrorists
among us be warned . . . [w]e will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We will
use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and
enhance security for America.”).
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procedural rights of the accused. On the other hand, some argue
that prioritizing the accused’s civil rights throughout their capture
and prosecution is both advisable and necessary in order to protect
national security and values.3 Under this view, the interest in
maintaining procedural integrity or legitimacy of the legal system
in dangerous times outweighs the interest in a potentially
overinclusive prosecutorial policy.
This Comment takes the latter view with specific regard to the
issue of the appropriate parameters of the mens rea requirements
used to prosecute and convict accused terrorists, narrowly focusing
on the doctrine of willful blindness. Willful blindness4 as a concept
has long been a part of U.S. criminal law as a valuable means to
convict those accused of committing offenses requiring a mens rea
of knowledge who deliberately act to avoid inculpatory
knowledge. Recently though, the willful blindness doctrine has
grown dangerously overinclusive, resulting in a highly increased
risk of convicting defendants who have not acted willfully. Many
thinkers have questioned logical inconsistencies in the current
doctrine, and courts have struggled to formulate clear and proper
jury instructions on willful blindness due to confusion over the
doctrine’s proper scope. Additionally, courts and scholars have
increasingly criticized the doctrine’s tendency to convict
defendants for mere negligence, or at worst, for mere guilt by
association. With most terror charges requiring a mens rea
requirement of “knowledge” or “willfulness” (particularly
3 See generally William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security:
The Strategic Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 280 (2004) (arguing that a
reconceptualization of the relationship between human rights and national
security, including adherence to procedural safeguards relating to human rights,
may yield innumerous social, legal, and political benefits).
4 “Willful blindness” is perhaps the most common term for the concept
discussed in this Comment, and will be used throughout for the sake of
consistency. However, the same concept is alternatively referred to by numerous
equivalent terms, such as “deliberate ignorance,” “deliberate blindness,” “willful
(or wilful) ignorance,” or “conscious avoidance,” to name a few. Some also refer
to willful blindness jury instructions as “ostrich” instructions, for example, see
United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2006), or “Jewell
instructions,” after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling approving such an instruction in
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). These terms are used
interchangeably by both courts and scholars. For discussion of the multiplicity of
terms used by courts and scholars for the willful blindness concept, see Thomas
A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge:
A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 222 n.62 (1997) and Robin Charlow,
Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1352 n.1, 1354 n.8
(1992).
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conspiracy charges, for example), the dangers of the doctrine of
willful blindness become highly relevant. These dangers are
particularly acute when applied to the context of those accused of
acts of international terrorism5 in U.S. courts and in military
tribunals, where many defendants may face execution upon a
guilty verdict.
In short, this Comment argues that dangers posed by
misconstruing and misapplying the willful blindness doctrine
create a lurking problem of overinclusive prosecution. These
dangers have heightened significance in the context of those
accused of acts of international terrorism, who may be subject to
execution if convicted. In light of this context, this Comment
argues that a reexamination of the willful blindness doctrine is
necessary to prevent its improper and overinclusive use. This is
not at all to say that prosecutions of accused terrorists should be
limited in any way from ordinary prosecutions, or that any special
protections should be afforded to such defendants beyond such
ordinary paradigms. Rather, the argument is premised more
narrowly on the idea that sufficient legal avenues to convict terror
suspects exist such that an overbroad construal of willful blindness
is neither necessary nor advisable to effect such prosecutions.
Thus, expressed most basically, this Comment contends that the
willful blindness doctrine should not be misused to improperly
convict defendants of crimes that they did not commit, yet flaws in
the current doctrine create the potential for just that risk.
This Comment maintains that legal, political, cultural, and
foreign policy interests support a narrower construction of the
willful blindness doctrine, and that such interests are heightened
with regard to those accused of international terrorism. This
Comment further argues that reexamination and properly narrow
application of the doctrine as a whole are small but necessary steps
to improve the procedural integrity of the U.S. legal system,
particularly the prosecutorial scheme for terror defendants.
Regard for propriety in the legal structure and process—
5 The precise definition of acts of international terrorism is the subject of
voluminous debate. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERROR AND ANTITERRORISM: A NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT 19-43 (2006) (discussing
national and international definitions of terrorism, and the need to arrive at a
consensus); Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining the Problem, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 9, 16 (David A. Charters ed., 1991) (discussing the
quest for a proper definition of international terrorism, and settling on a
generalized definition).
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augmented by well-founded criticisms concerning the basis for,
and misunderstanding of, the willful blindness doctrine as a
whole—supports a careful reexamination of the use of the doctrine
in light of its currently overbroad scope.6
Moreover, a
reexamination and narrower tailoring of the willful blindness
doctrine would be a small but valuable step toward improving the
procedural integrity of the U.S. legal system, with regard to both
the prosecution of terror detainees and U.S. criminal law as a
whole. This step may also contribute to legitimizing the U.S.
government’s terror prosecutions in the eyes of the international
community, which would be of significant political benefit to the
United States. In a larger sense, this benefit could serve the
interests of the War on Terror, by promoting both civil rights and
national security.
The Comment proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the
context of the War on Terror by way of background, and the
procedures used to prosecute and detain those accused of acts of
international terrorism, including detainees. This Section sets the
stage for arguing that abrogating the mens rea requirements used
to convict terror defendants by applying an overbroad view of
willful blindness would undermine the legitimacy of such
convictions, and potentially exacerbate existing domestic and
international hostility toward the War on Terror’s means and ends.
Section 3 analyzes the concept of willful blindness and the current
doctrine, looking particularly at the relationship between willful
blindness and knowledge to focus the reader’s understanding on
the doctrine’s proper purpose. Section 3 further examines willful
blindness in domestic U.S. law and then discusses the superseding
international criminal law doctrine of “joint criminal enterprise,” to
illustrate how far the willful blindness doctrine can reach if
unchecked. Section 4 examines some criticisms of the current
scope and improper applications of the willful blindness doctrine,
including some suggested limitations that may help to properly
confine it. Section 5 argues for reexamining and reining in the
willful blindness doctrine, specifically in the context of
prosecutions of those accused of acts of international terrorism,
while acknowledging competing policy interests and critical
responses. The Comment concludes that a reexamination of the
willful blindness doctrine will be a small but valuable step toward
6 See generally Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When structure fails, liberty is always in peril.”).
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increasing the procedural legitimacy of U.S. terror prosecutions,
thus improving the integrity of the U.S. legal system while
promoting significant foreign policy interests.
2.

THE WAR ON TERROR

To understand why an overinclusive willful blindness doctrine
poses special dangers to those accused of international terrorism, it
is necessary to examine the context of the U.S.-led War on Terror.
By way of background, this Section discusses some of the most
salient (and criticized) aspects of the U.S. terror prosecution
scheme. This background of existing erosions in terror defendants’
and detainees’ legal procedural protections suggests that improper
use of the willful blindness doctrine poses a unique risk of
contributing to or exacerbating such problems. Similarly, a
discussion of the domestic and international community’s
generally hostile response to such erosions helps to introduce some
of the foreign policy issues at stake. Together, this background
serves to bring the roots and scope of the problem into focus for
the specific discussion of willful blindness later in this Comment.
To clarify, this Section is not intended to serve as a partisan
political diatribe, or to endorse any particular political view. The
purpose instead is to outline some of the domestic and
international criticisms that the United States has incurred as a
result of the policies and procedures undertaken in the War on
Terror. The Section particularly focuses on those related to
perceived failures in legal procedural fairness. This focus on
criticism of the war is not intended to be political in nature, but
rather to highlight the kinds of procedural improprieties—both
actual and perceived—that, if reformed, could improve the
perceived legitimacy of U.S. terror prosecutions. Specifically, this
Comment, in examining the dangers of misuse and misapplication
of the willful blindness doctrine, argues that improving and fairly
applying the willful blindness doctrine where it ought to be
applicable (rather than applying it over-broadly) will be a small
but useful step in responding to such criticism. Doing so, it argues,
would accordingly be a small but useful step in reforming the
actual and perceived procedural integrity of the United States legal
scheme for prosecuting those accused of international terrorism.
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2.1. 9/11 as a Catalyst for Change in Policy
The international community scrambled to address the threats
posed by international terrorism following the attacks of
September 11, 2001.7 For the United States in particular, the attacks
served as a catalyst for an abrupt and dramatic change in domestic
and foreign policy.8 One of the principal elements of this change
was a new policy of proactive enforcement9 and preemption,10
commonly referred to as the War on Terror.11 Beyond a distinctly
proactive military strategy,12 the policy shift also manifested itself
in a broad range of social and adjudicative mechanisms to address
threats posed by international terrorism. These controversial latter
mechanisms13 are the most relevant to this discussion; specifically,
7 See J. Craig Barker, The Politics of International Law-Making: Constructing
Security in Response to Global Terrorism, 3 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 5, 5 (2007)
(characterizing the international community’s response to the problem of global
terrorism as an “apparent rush to law”).
8 See 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 28 (“The events of
September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations between the
United States and other main centers of global power, and opened vast, new
opportunities.”).
9 Id. at Introduction (“To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in
our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement,
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. . . . [A]s a matter of
common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats
before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by
hoping for the best. . . . In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace
and security is the path of action.”).
10 Id. at 15 (“To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”).
11 Some have questioned the propriety of defining such a conflict as one of
“war.” See Brien Hallett, Dishonest Crimes, Dishonest Language: An Argument about
Terrorism, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS, CONSEQUENCES,
AND INTERVENTIONS 49, 56 (Fathali M. Moghaddam & Anthony J. Marsella eds.,
2004) (“The problem is that terrorists are not waging a ‘war’; they are committing
crimes. . . . [I]f ‘war’ is the positive image of ‘political violence,’ then terrorism is
its negative image.”).
12 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 29 (“The major
institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet
different requirements. All of them must be transformed. It is time to reaffirm
the essential role of American military strength.”).
13 While criticism of the breadth of such a preemptive approach to foreign
policy relating to international terrorism has proliferated, some prominent
defense lawyers have indicated a limited ideological support of such a strategy,
finding it necessary to combat the terrorist threat effectively. See ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE 27 (2002) (“An act of terrorism should be the occasion only for
punishment and incapacitation, not for negotiation and consideration of root
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the means by which those suspected of acts of international
terrorism have been arrested, detained, and prosecuted.
2.2. Detainment Centers and Extraordinary Rendition
The use of detainment centers has been one controversial
aspect of the U.S. strategy in prosecuting terror suspects. These
detainment centers have been severely criticized on numerous
grounds, including for reportedly limiting detainees’ access to
legal counsel and limiting their ability to confront evidence against
them.14 Additionally, prisoner abuses at detainment centers such
as Abu Ghraib15 have been the subject of extensive media coverage,
resulting in increased public disapproval of U.S. approaches to
terror prosecution.16 Such abuses have also resulted in strong
rebukes from human rights advocacy organizations.17 In addition,

causes. The message must be that nothing will be gained by terrorism, and much
will be lost. . . . This would seem an obvious and simple first principle in dealing
with terrorism . . . . [However,] the international community has responded in
precisely the opposite manner.”).
14 See William Glaberson, Court Tells U.S. to Reveal Data on Guantánamo, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2007, at A1 (“Advocates for detainees have criticized the tribunals
since they were instituted in 2004 because the terror suspects held at Guantanamo
have not been permitted lawyers during the proceedings and have not been
allowed to see much of the evidence against them.”).
15 See Torture in Abu Ghraib, in THE PHENOMENON OF TORTURE: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY 60, 60–62 (William F. Schultz, ed. 2007) (providing a sworn
statement from an Abu Ghraib detainee which details extensive physical,
psychological and sexual abuse at the hands of U.S. interrogators).
16 See H. L. POHLMAN, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 117 (2008)
(describing television reports of abuses of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib
broadcasting graphic photos, noting, “The parade of depressing photos
contributed to the declining popular support for the Iraq war. [President] Bush’s
job approval rating dropped to 46 percent—the lowest up to that point in time.”)
(citations omitted); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity:
Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 427, 427 (2006)
(“The greatest contemporary challenge faced by liberal democratic societies in
confronting terrorism is the dilemma of balancing the legitimate national security
interests of the State and the civil liberties of the individual. Perhaps no issue
represents that tension more than the dilemma faced by democratic societies
about how to conduct interrogation of suspected terrorists in custody. Accounts
of abuses that have occurred at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Bagram have
served to bring the balancing issue to the forefront of the debate of how the
United States . . . reacts to terrorism.”).
17 See World Org. for Human Rights USA, Update to the 87th Session of the
United
Nations
Human
Rights
Committee
(June
15,
2006),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICCPR_shadow_report
.pdf (outlining concerns regarding torture, extraordinary rendition, indefinite

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/6

2008]

WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE

699

the secrecy surrounding detainment centers such as those in
Guantanamo Bay have incurred similar suspicion and criticism.18
Others have claimed that mistreatment of detainees in U.S. custody
may violate the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.19
In response to this international criticism, some U.S. officials
have argued that protections enumerated in the Geneva
Conventions20 do not apply to detainees who are deemed to be
unlawful enemy combatants.21 While this argument has been
weakened both by scholars22 and recent Supreme Court holdings,23
it has persisted.24

detention and claims of exemption from human rights standards by the U.S.
government with regard to treatment of detainees).
18 See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A
Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data (Seton Hall
Public Law Research Paper No. 46, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885659 (analyzing declassified information about
detainees at Guantanamo).
19 See, e.g., Torture and Inhumane Treatment: A Deliberate U.S. Policy, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT, Jan. 2006, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k6
/introduction/2.htm. For the text of the Convention itself, see Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 2, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, June 26, 1987, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf,
prohibits
torture
and
obligates state signatories to take various measures to ensure compliance. Office
of the High Commission for Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations (Apr.
23, 2004), For the U.S. reservations to that Convention, see http://www.unhchr.ch
/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm which limits the Senate’s
advice and consent to ratification of the Convention and specifies particular
understandings of relevant terminology.
20 Specifically, this refers to rights provided by the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, and the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
21 Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident
/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114-1.html (“The basic proposition here is that
somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a
terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans, men, women, and
children, is not a lawful combatant. They don’t deserve to be treated as a prisoner
of war. They don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be
used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process. . . .
[T]hey will have a fair trial, but it’ll be under the procedures of a military tribunal
and rules and regulations to be established in connection with that. We think it’s
the appropriate way to go.”) [hereinafter Cheney remarks].
22 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 231 (“Today, common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides minimum protections for all persons
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Additionally, vociferous critique has centered on the practice of
extraordinary rendition—where suspected terrorists have been
taken overseas and allegedly tortured—in CIA “black sites.”25
Such foreign locations—the identities of which have been withheld
from the public, as well as many members of both U.S. and foreign
host governments26—are reportedly used for indefinite detention
to obtain information from alleged terrorists beyond the scrutiny of
U.S. law.27 These practices, instituted shortly after the September
11, 2001 attacks,28 have incurred the ire of domestic and

captured in any armed conflict. These protections include basic due process
guarantees.”) (citations omitted).
23 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that military
commissions at Guantanamo Bay violated Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva
Convention, while noting that the legislature may be able to grant the executive
branch power statutorily to use military commissions under domestic law).
24 See Stuart Taylor Jr., Overplaying Its Hand, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 2008,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/141509 (“[A]fter 9/11, hard-liners in
the administration decided that terror suspects brought to Guantánamo and
various secret prisons around the world lacked any of the protections of the
Geneva accords because they were ‘unlawful combatants.’”).
25 See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html (drawing attention to socalled CIA “black sites” referenced in a variety of executive branch classified
documents, as well as offering an overview of the way these locations are used).
26 Id. (“The hidden global internment network is a central element in the
CIA’s unconventional war on terrorism. It depends on the cooperation of foreign
intelligence services, and on keeping even basic information about the system
secret from the public, foreign officials and nearly all members of Congress
charged with overseeing the CIA’s covert actions. The existence and locations of
the facilities—referred to as ‘black sites’ in classified White House, CIA, Justice
Department and congressional documents—are known to only a handful of
officials in the United States and, usually, only to the president and a few top
intelligence officers in each host country. . . . The Washington Post is not
publishing the names of the Eastern European countries involved in the covert
program, at the request of senior U.S. officials. They argued that the disclosure
might disrupt counterterrorism efforts in those countries and elsewhere and could
make them targets of possible terrorist retaliation.”).
27 Id. (“Although the CIA will not acknowledge details of its system,
intelligence officials defend the agency’s approach, arguing that the successful
defense of the country requires that the agency be empowered to hold and
interrogate suspected terrorists for as long as necessary and without restrictions
imposed by the U.S. legal system or even by the military tribunals established for
prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.”).
28 Id. (“The secret detention system was conceived in the chaotic and anxious
first months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the working assumption was
that a second strike was imminent.”).
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international authorities, in addition to human rights advocates.29
The practices have also been the subject of foreign indictments of
CIA operatives.30 While these practices have been defended by the
CIA as essential information gathering tools,31 their moral and
legal legitimacy reportedly have also been internally hotly debated
according to reports.32
In sum, concerns over the procedural mechanisms used to
prosecute terror defendants, particularly Guantanamo detainees,
are particularly acute in light of the such defendants’ uniquely
compromised situation as previously described.
Moreover,
because the willful blindness doctrine requires a mens rea of
knowledge—as do most charges against those accused of acts of
international terrorism—the propriety of its use and application is
of paramount importance in the context of that debate.
2.3. Military Commissions
Trials for those accused of acts of international terrorism in the
current War on Terror may be conducted in specialized tribunals
known as military commissions.33 Military commissions have a
29 Id. (“[R]evelations of widespread prisoner abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq
by the U.S. military—which operates under published rules and transparent
oversight of Congress—have increased concern among lawmakers, foreign
governments and human rights groups about the opaque CIA system.”).
30 See Devika Bhat et al., Italian Judge Orders First ‘Rendition’ Trial of CIA
Agents, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news
/world/europe/article1395637.ece (describing the first criminal court case
regarding extraordinary rendition, indicting twenty-six Americans and five
Italians over the abduction of Abu Omar in Milan and his alleged torture in
Egypt).
31 Priest, supra note 25 (“Although the CIA will not acknowledge details of its
system, intelligence officials defend the agency’s approach, arguing that the
successful defense of the country requires that the agency be empowered to hold
and interrogate suspected terrorists for as long as necessary and without
restrictions imposed by the U.S. legal system or even by the military tribunals
established for prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.”).
32 Id. (“Since then, the arrangement has been increasingly debated within the
CIA, where considerable concern lingers about the legality, morality and
practicality of holding even unrepentant terrorists in such isolation and secrecy,
perhaps for the duration of their lives. Mid-level and senior CIA officers began
arguing two years ago that the system was unsustainable and diverted the agency
from its unique espionage mission.”).
33 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006) [hereinafter MCA] (establishing “procedures governing the use of
military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other
offenses triable by military commission”); William Glaberson, Portable Halls of
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long history in United States law as a response to extraordinary
national security threats such as war.34 In that context, their use
has been deemed constitutional in certain limited circumstances.35
These circumstances originally included situations where the
defendant is connected with the military or is a prisoner of war;
where the offense charged dealt with a violation of the law of war;
where domestic courts were insufficient or inoperative; and where
some governmental “necessity” could be demonstrated.36
Justice Are Rising in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/us/14gitmo.html?fta=y (“If and when
the trials begin, they will be held under a set of rules created especially for trying
terrorism suspects. And now they will be held in a setting created especially for
terrorism suspects.”).
34 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (discussing the use of a
military tribunal to try a civilian U.S. citizen arrested in Indiana for planning to
raid a federal arsenal and use the weapons obtained there to free Confederate
prisoners); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); (dismissing an appeal
from a trial by military commission of a civilian U.S. citizen for charges relating to
publishing libelous news articles for lack of jurisdiction); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 18 (1942) (affirming conviction in trial by military commission for seven
German nationals and a dual U.S.-German nationals accused of sabotage,
espionage, and “violations of the law of war”).
35 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592–601 (2006) (finding that while the
particular military commissions at Guantanamo Bay violated Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, Congress may grant the President power to use
military commissions under domestic law).
36 See, e.g., Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121–22 (“[Military commissions] can never be
applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government,
and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed. This court has
judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed,
and its courts always open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances;
and no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever
of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. . . . Why
was [Milligan] not delivered to the Circuit Court of Indiana to be proceeded
against according to law? No reason of necessity could be urged against it;
because Congress had declared penalties against the offences charged, provided
for their punishment, and directed that court to hear and determine them. And
soon after this military tribunal was ended, the Circuit Court met, peacefully
transacted its business, and adjourned. It needed no bayonets to protect it, and
required no military aid to execute its judgments. It was held in a state, eminently
distinguished for patriotism, by judges commissioned during the Rebellion, who
were provided with juries, upright, intelligent, and selected by a marshal
appointed by the President. The government had no right to conclude that
Milligan, if guilty, would not receive in that court merited punishment . . . .”);
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29 (“Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of
war before such commissions. We are concerned only with the question whether
it is within the constitutional power of the national government to place
petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which
they are charged. We must therefore first inquire whether any of the acts charged
is an offense against the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal, and if so
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Currently, while particular military commissions’ procedures have
been deemed illegal domestically and internationally,37 use of
military commissions in general has been authorized by
legislation.38
Charges brought in trials by military commissions deal with
violations of the laws of war39 and other related matters.40
However, many of the charges retain similarities to more
whether the Constitution prohibits the trial. . . . [A]s we shall show, these
petitioners were charged with an offense against the law of war which the
Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.”).
37 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634–35 (holding that military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay violated Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention
and constitutional boundaries of Executive power); see generally id. at 641 (“If the
military commission at issue is illegal under the law of war, then an offender
cannot be tried ‘by the law of war’ before that commission.”).
38 See MCA, supra note 33 (authorizing the use of military commissions to try
unlawful enemy combatants); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109148, § 1005 (2005) (establishing procedural requirements for Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”)); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (2006) (“The
dissenters say that today’s decision would ‘sorely hamper the President’s ability
to confront and defeat a new and deadly enemy.’ They suggest that it
undermines our Nation’s ability to ‘preven[t] future attacks’ of the grievous sort
that we have already suffered. That claim leads me to state briefly what I believe
the majority sets forth both explicitly and implicitly at greater length. The Court’s
conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the
Executive a ‘blank check.’ Indeed, Congress has denied the President the
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here.
Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority
he believes necessary.” (internal citations omitted)).
39 See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF
WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1–2
(Dec. 11, 2001) available at http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
7951.pdf (discussing that classifying terrorist acts as violations of the international
law of war rather than criminal acts permits trials by military commissions rather
than in federal courts); see also William Glaberson, Court Advances Military Trials
For Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/washington/25gitmo.html
(indicating
that as many as eighty detainees may eventually face war crimes charges
according to chief prosecutor, Col. Morris D. Davis).
40 See, e.g., Charge Sheet, United States v. Hamdan, (Apr. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2007/Hamdan_Charges.pdf (charging
Hamdan with conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism); Charge
Sheet, United States v. Khadr (Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Khadr Charge Sheet]
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf
(charging Omar Ahmed Khadr with “murder in violation of the law of war”
amongst other charges); Charge Sheet, United States v. Jawad, (Apr. 6, 2007)
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2007/Jawad%20Charge
%20Sheet.pdf (charging Mohammed Jawad with “attempted murder in violation
of the law of war” amongst other charges).
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recognizable domestic charges, including, for example, murder
and conspiracy allegations.41 Some of the most frequent current
charges include conspiracy and material support for terrorism,
both of which generally require a mens rea of knowledge, thus
implicating the problems posed by overinclusive use of the willful
blindness doctrine.42
Defendants convicted in military
commissions for terror charges may include any range of
sentences, including life imprisonment43 or execution.44
Military commissions offer a level of efficiency to prosecutors
that exceeds that of domestic courts. In light of this function, the
U.S. Department of Defense has touted the usefulness and
practicality of employing military commissions rather than federal
courts for trying terror cases.45 Some, however, have questioned
the propriety of the military commissions’ approach to achieving
justice,46 while others have criticized the choice to employ them in
the current context of the War on Terror.47
See, e.g., Khadr Charge Sheet, supra note 40.
See, e.g., id. at 5–6 (charging that Khadr “knowingly committed overt acts”
in furtherance of the conspiracy and “intentionally [provided] material or
resources” to groups “known by the accused to be an organization that engages in
terrorism”).
43 E.g., Detainee Dragged to Gitmo War Crimes Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May
21, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24758702/ (discussing life
imprisonment as one possible sentence in tribunals).
44 E.g., William Glaberson, U.S. Said to Seek Execution for 6 in Sept. 11 Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02
/11/us/11gitmo.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1202742208
-Y3V09jempSOnrvusn64lpw (discussing execution as a potential punishment) .
45 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Defense, Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge
at Guantanamo Trial (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10678 (announcing conviction of David Matthew
Hicks for material support to terrorism, stating: “Military commissions provide a
mechanism to serve justice to those accused of law of war violations while
keeping the United States, friends and allies safe from those bent on carrying out
attacks on civilian populations and coalition forces.”).
46 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 13, at 217 (“[T]he military approach to justice . .
. . will encourage many Americans to view the military approach to trials—which
favors efficiency and certainty over fairness and the resolution of doubts in favor
of the accused—as the norm rather than the exception. This must never be
allowed to happen, if our liberties are to be preserved.”).
47 See, e.g., BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 230–31 (referring to the current use of
secret military commissions to try accused terrorists as a “sad prospect” and
calling the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin as “embarrassing”); RICHARD B.
ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 5 (2008),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf
41
42
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Much of the criticism regarding the current use of military
commissions has centered on their procedural and substantive
differences from regularly constituted American courts.48
Procedurally, military commissions differ sharply from ordinary
U.S. courts49 in numerous ways that some argue may compromise
For example, military commissions have
their legitimacy.50
endured criticism for the secrecy of their proceedings,51 on the
(concluding that “contrary to the views of some critics, the [federal courts are]
generally well-equipped to handle most terrorism cases”).
48 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3(1)(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (prohibiting state parties
from engaging in “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples”).
Whether the military commissions currently employed by the U.S.
government qualify as regularly constituted courts—or, alternatively, whether
they are required to comply with that requirement at all—has been the subject of
debate. However, several U.S. courts have indicated that military commissions
are not to be considered traditional regularly constituted courts under the Geneva
Conventions or the Constitution. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–32
(2006) (discussing the unresolved questions regarding the “regularly constituted”
requirements of Common Article 3, and finding that the military commissions at
issue do not qualify); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (“[M]ilitary
tribunals, which are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article, and which in
the natural course of events are usually called upon to function under conditions
precluding resort to such procedures.” (citations omitted)).
Congress attempted to resolve the question definitively by statute in 2006. See
MCA, supra note 33, § 948b(f) (“A military commission established under this
chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’ for
purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”). However, the
provision carries little to no weight as a matter of international law. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions
/1_1_1969.pdf (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
49 See supra citations and discussion in note 48. But see Glaberson, supra note
39 (citing the United States Court of Military Commission Review’s opinion that
Congress intended Guantanamo tribunals to apply usual procedures of military
courts).
50 See generally Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 97 (2005) (“[P]roceedings perceived
as illegitimate are not likely to foster peace and reconciliation.”).
51 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 13, at 214 (“Another important check on
governmental overreaching is trial by jury and open trials. That check was
substantially undercut by President George W. Bush’s authorization of military
tribunals to try noncitizens suspected of ties to terrorism.”); see generally N.Y.
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grounds that such secrecy may offend the constitution’s provisions
regarding public trials.52 Military commissions also depart from
the practices of ordinary courts in several other controversial ways,
including that they: allow classes of evidence ordinarily deemed
inadmissible;53 restrict the kinds of legal counsel available to an
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas J., concurring)
(“Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic.”); John F. Kennedy,
Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, (Apr. 27, 1961),
reprinted in JOHN F. KENNEDY: IN HIS OWN WORDS 91 (Eric Freedman & Edward
Hoffman eds., Kensington Publishing Corp 2005) (“The very word ‘secrecy’ is
repugnant in a free and open society, and we are as a people inherently and
historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths and to secret proceedings.
We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment
of pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it. Even
today, there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its
arbitrary restrictions. Even today, there is little value in insuring the survival of
our nation if our traditions do not survive with it. And there is very grave danger
that an announced need for increased security will be seized upon by those
anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official censorship and
concealment. And no official of my administration, whether his rank is high or
low, civilian or military, should interpret my words here tonight as an excuse to
censor the news, to stifle dissent, to cover up our mistakes or to withhold from the
press and the public the facts they deserve to know.”).
While measures have been suggested that would add transparency to these
proceedings, such measures nonetheless allow for a degree of anonymity greatly
exceeding that of regularly constituted U.S. courts. See Glaberson, supra note 33
(“One new feature for trials expected to involve classified evidence is a plexiglass
window separating the small press and spectator gallery from the floor of the
courtroom. At the touch of a button, the military judge will be able to cut off the
sound in the spectator section.”); see also Sara Moore, Defense Department Seeks
Death Penalty for Six Guantanamo Detainees, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE NEWS
ARTICLES, Feb. 11, 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news
/newsarticle.aspx?id=48930 (stating that “the Defense Department will make the
hearings as open as possible”).
52 See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 488 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory,
J., concurring in part) (“The entire process is cloaked in secrecy, making it
difficult, if not impossible, for the courts to ensure the provision of Moussaoui’s
rights. . . . Moussaoui has constitutional rights, not extended to the prosecution,
that are implicated by this procedure [of permitting only redacted summaries of
witness testimony to be entered by the government rather than allowing the
defendant to confront and cross examine such witnesses directly]. . . . [T]oday
justice has taken a long stride backward.”).
53 See, e.g., id. (describing the use of redacted witness statements against the
accused without cross-examination); Kelli Arena & Carol Cratty, Lawyer Fears 9/11
Mastermind Trial will be “Insanity”, CNN.COM,
Apr. 24, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/23/ksm.attorney/index.html (quoting a
defense lawyer as arguing: “Even the greenest deputy sheriff or rookie police
officer in Skunk Hollow County knows that if you rough up a defendant,
anything he says after that is not going to be admitted into court . . . . The officer
might not like those rules, but he understands them and will abide by them. . . .
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accused;54 abrogate confidentiality protections between the accused
and his counsel;55 and severely limit defendants’ appellate rights.56

We have created a system under the military commissions that says in essence, ‘if
he was roughed up, but what he says still seems reliable, we’ll accept it any way.’
And that’s just wrong.”); Editorial, Restoring American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2007, at A18 (criticizing the MCA for allowing “the introduction of evidence
tainted by coercion” and permitting the creation of “kangaroo courts in
Guantanamo Bay that declare prisoners enemy combatants without a real hearing
or reliable evidence.”). But see generally MCA, supra note 33, § 948r(b) (“A
statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admissible in a military
commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of torture as
evidence that the statement was made.”).
54 See MCA, supra note 33, § 948k(b) (providing qualification requirements for
defense counsel, including requiring that any civilian counsel be “otherwise
qualified to practice before the military commission pursuant to regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.”). If civilian counsel is not deemed
“otherwise qualified,” (due to lack of security clearance, for example) the
defendant may be represented by military counsel known as a judge advocate.
MCA §§ 948k(b)(1), (c) (providing prerequisites for trial counsel, including judge
advocates); see also Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 801 art.
1(13) (2006) available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/UCMJ.pdf
(indicating that qualified judge advocates must be an officer of a branch of the
armed services).
Additionally, the defendant in a CSRT proceeding—which determines
whether or not he will be classified as an enemy combatant in the military
commission—often is not provided with traditional legal counsel at all, but rather
with a “personal representative” who is a member of the prosecuting military. See
MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS: CSRT: THE MODERN
HABEAS CORPUS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS AT GUANTANAMO 4 (2006) available at
http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf (“The detainees
were denied any right to counsel. Instead, they were assigned a ‘personal
representative’ who advised each detainee that the personal representative was
neither his lawyer nor his advocate, and that anything that the detainee said could
be used against him. In contrast to the absence of any legal representative for the
detainee, the Tribunal was required to have at least one lawyer and the Recorder
(Prosecutor) was recommended to be a lawyer. The assigned role of the personal
representative was to assist the detainee to present his case. In practice, any
assistance was extraordinarily limited.”).
55 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 54 at 15 (“At that initial meeting
with each detainee, the personal representative had several tasks, including
warning the detainee that the personal representative was not the detainee’s
lawyer and that nothing discussed would be held in confidence [by saying]: ‘I am
neither a lawyer nor your advocate, but have been given the responsibility of
assisting your preparation for the hearing. None of the information you provide me
shall be held in confidence and I may be obligated to divulge it at the hearing. I am
available to assist you in preparing an oral or written presentation to the Tribunal
should you desire to do so.’” (citation omitted)).
56 See MCA, supra note 33, § 950j(b) (stripping appellate rights for those tried
by military commission); see generally In re Yamashita, 66 S. Ct. 340, 353 (1946)
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Defendants, however, are permitted to challenge their detention in
U.S. federal courts.57 In particular, the lack of evidentiary
disclosure requirements in cases where the government cites
classified national security interests58 has been a flashpoint of
criticism. Finally, some scholars have alleged that military
commissions unjustly pursue guilt by association in a manner
evocative of the oft-criticized international criminal liability theory
of joint criminal enterprise (which is discussed below).59
As a result of these erosions of defendants’ procedural
protections, concerns have been raised regarding whether
defendants are provided with an adequate opportunity for a fair
Specifically, some have
trial before military commissions.60
suggested that the use of military commissions and related aspects
of the U.S. terror prosecution scheme may violate the U.S.
Constitution or the International Covenant on Civil and Political

(denying writ of habeas corpus for defendant Japanese general convicted of
violations of the law of war in a trial by military commission).
57 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2275–76 (2008) (finding § 7 of the
Military Commissions Act unconstitutional, and affording habeas rights to
detainees); see also Bill Mears, Justices: Gitmo Detainees Can Challenge Detention in
U.S. Courts, CNN.COM, June 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/12/
scotus/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (discussing the Boumediene ruling).
58 See UCMJ, § 801 art. 1(15)–(16) (broadly defining “classified information”
as “any information or material that has been determined by an official of the
United States pursuant to law, an Executive order, or regulation to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security” and
defining “national security” as encompassing both “the national defense” and
“foreign relations” of the United States); Mil. R. Evid. 505(a) (“Classified
information is privileged from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the
national security. As with other rules of privilege this rule applies to all stages of
the proceedings.”); see also ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 650 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2007) (discussing the “State Secrets Doctrine”).
59 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 80 (“The military commissions
instituted by the U.S. government to try suspected terrorists include both
command responsibility and a liability theory that closely resembles joint criminal
enterprise, and the first indictments of Guantanamo detainees implicitly rely on
this joint criminal enterprise theory of liability.” (citation omitted)); see also infra
Section 3.3.
60 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED RULES FOR MILITARY
COMMISSIONS TRIALS, http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/07125-usls-hrf-rcmanalysis.pdf (arguing that “key flaws” in the procedural and evidentiary systems
used in military commissions undermine defendants’ right to a fair trial); see
generally Detainee Dragged to Gitmo War Crimes Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 21,
2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24758702/ (describing a
detainee “boycott” of the military commissions rooted in perceived inequities in
trial procedures).
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Rights.61 These procedural erosions create a risk of overinclusive
convictions and executions, which are augmented by the
overinclusive risks inherent in the present willful blindness
doctrine.
2.3.1.

Prosecutions of Detainees Accused of Planning the 9/11
Attacks

The U.S. government has recently sought to try several
Guantanamo detainees for alleged involvement in planning the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.62 Many of the trials will likely
be held by military commission.63 Some have criticized the
decision to have the trials conducted by military commission rather
than in domestic courts on the grounds discussed above, while
others have suggested critiques on more naked political grounds.64
Such criticism is amplified by the CIA’s admission that at least
some of these defendants were subject to harsh interrogation
methods such as waterboarding to obtain information which may
be used against them at trial.65 The defendant detainees at such
trials, if found guilty, would likely face execution.66
61 See John Cerone, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the
Relationship between the International Law of Armed Conflict and US Law, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Nov. 13, 2006, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2006
/11/insights061114.html (arguing that the MCA may violate both constitutional
law and international law, specifically Article 15 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights); see also World Organization for Human Rights USA,
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Update to the 87th Session of
the
United
Nations
Human
Rights
Committee,
(June
15,
2006)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICCPR_shadow
_report.pdf (arguing that various aspects of the U.S. terror prosecution scheme,
including detention centers and the use of rendition violate the ICCPR).
62 Glaberson, supra note 44 (discussing the U.S. government’s intention to try
six former detainees accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks by military
commission).
63 Id.
64 See Adam Zagorin, Gitmo Trials: The Political Agenda, TIME, June 8, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1812705,00.html
(examining the political ramifications of the Guantanamo trials of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and four alleged co-conspirators).
65 Glaberson, supra note 44.
66 Id.; see also Adam Zagorin, Alleged 9/11 Plotter Holds Court, TIME, June 5,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1812114,00
.html (“Confessed terrorist mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told U.S.
military judge Ralph Kohlman on Thursday that he would represent himself at his
[trial by military commission], and that he welcomed the death penalty that
would make him a ‘martyr.’”).
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This Comment does not take a position on the appropriateness
of a retributivist attitude toward such defendants,67 as such a
question is beyond this Comment’s scope. Rather, this Comment
argues simply that the dangers of misunderstanding and
misapplying the willful blindness doctrine may undermine the
appropriateness and effectiveness of the procedural and structural
mechanisms used to prosecute such defendants. On a general
level, as suggested above, many have posited that military
commissions are inherently unable to deal with such trials
adequately because of systematic procedural infirmities.68 On a
specific level, improper or overbroad interpretation of the
“knowledge” mens rea requirement—necessary to convict
defendants at such trials, including those based on the theory of
willful blindness—is one particular potential procedural infirmity
on which this Comment focuses. As argued above, this potential
problem has special importance in such trials, where the
consequences are particularly serious and various other procedural
protections are limited.
In one such case, the U.S. government has recommended trying
defendant detainees jointly.69 This result would be desirable for
government prosecutors but highly disadvantageous to the
defendants, increasing the risk that a guilt-by-association concept
will be used to convict them. The conspiracy charge—one among
the 169 charges against the detainees—bears out this concern, as
the government contends that the defendants participated in “a
long-term, highly sophisticated, organized plan by al-Qaeda to
attack the United States.”70 As this latter charge in particular
requires a mens rea of knowledge (which may be satisfied by
willful blindness), concerns regarding the proper interpretation
and application of willful blindness are of immediately acute

67 See generally Glaberson, supra note 44 (quoting the spouse of a 9/11 victim
as saying “if the death of 3,000 people isn’t sufficient for a death penalty in this
country, then why do we even have the death penalty?”).
68 Id. (discussing several critiques of the adequacy of military commissions to
handle a death penalty trial of detainees, quoting a former Guantanamo military
defense lawyer as saying that “[n]either the system is ready, nor are the defense
attorneys ready to do a death penalty case in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba“).
69 Sara Moore, Defense Department Seeks Death Penalty for Six Guantanamo
Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. NEWS ARTICLES, Feb. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48930 (noting that the
chief prosecutor recommended trying all six defendants jointly).
70 Id.
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importance to current and future terror prosecutions. However, it
is important to reemphasize here that the dangers of overinclusive
use of the willful blindness doctrine apply to any offense requiring
a mens rea of knowledge, and not merely to conspiracy charges
alone.
2.4. Domestic Terror Trials
In addition to the cases before the military commissions
discussed above, several trials of those accused of acts of
international terrorism have taken place in U.S. domestic courts.
One of the most high profile of such cases occurring in a domestic
court was that of Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged would-be 20th
hijacker in the 9/11 terrorist attacks).71 Notably, that trial also
specifically involved multiple conspiracy charges,72 which required
a mens rea of acting knowingly.73
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion affirming Moussaoui’s conviction
likewise indicates that some of the procedural erosions described
earlier in this Section may also be implicated in domestic terror
prosecutions. In Moussaoui’s trial the government denied access
to certain witnesses (other terror suspects in U.S. custody) whom
Moussaoui sought to interview. The government claimed that
provision of unfettered access to such witnesses would threaten
national security. Instead, the Government provided redacted
summaries of those witnesses’ testimony over Moussaoui’s
objections that the summaries were unreliable, in part due to the
interrogation tactics allegedly used to obtain such statements. In
what has proven to be a controversial portion of the decision, the
Fourth Circuit generally affirmed the use of such redacted witness
statements, stating, “we are even more persuaded that the
[Redacted] process is carefully designed to elicit truthful and
accurate information from the witnesses. . . . [T]he jury should be
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 457 (describing various conspiracy charges against Moussaoui,
including “conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy; conspiracy to destroy air-craft;
conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction; conspiracy to murder United
States employees; and conspiracy to destroy property” (citations omitted)).
73 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)–(2) (1985) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) (indicating that “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another
person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating its commission” and “knows that a person with whom he conspires to
commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same
crime” (emphasis added)).
71
72
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informed that the circumstances were designed to elicit truthful
statements from the witnesses.”74 The deferential attitude of the
Fourth Circuit to the Government’s national security assertions
arguably indicates a continuing procedural erosion that those
accused of international terrorism may experience in terror trials,
including those before domestic courts. This kind of erosion
highlights the importance of reexamining the willful blindness
doctrine, so that its potentially overinclusive misuse does not
exacerbate the problem.
Thus, because domestic terror trials also involve charges
requiring a mens rea of knowledge, and because certain procedural
erosions in the rights of the accused exist in domestic courts as
well, they likewise implicate the lurking problems of overinclusive
application of the willful blindness doctrine. In short, the
problems implicated (or exacerbated) by abuse of the willful
blindness doctrine exist in both military commissions and domestic
courts.
2.5. Foreign Criminal Indictments and Domestic Civil Suits Involving
U.S. Officials
Criticism of U.S. strategy and detainee treatment has inspired
both domestic and international lawsuits launched against U.S.
political figures. For example, in November 2006, former Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was indicted in Germany for war
crimes for his role in formulating policies leading to the alleged
74 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 478, n.31. To be clear, the Fourth Circuit found no
problem with the general process of providing the summaries, stating: “Indeed,
organizing and distilling voluminous information for comprehensible
presentation to a jury is a hallmark of effective advocacy. In short, while there
may be problems with the manner in which the Government organized the
substitutions, the fact that the Government has attempted such organization is not
a mark against it.” Id. at 479. However, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case
because of the particular manner by which the summaries were organized, and
the fact that the jury was not given certain information regarding them.
Nonetheless, the Court noted that the District Court retained broad discretion
regarding the summaries. Id. at 478 (“We agree with the district court that in
order to adequately protect Moussaoui’s right to a fair trial, the jury must be made
aware of certain information concerning the substitutions. The particular content
of any instruction to the jury regarding the substitutions lies within the discretion
of the district court. . . .”). The Fourth Circuit did not however take issue with the
alleged unreliability of the statements elicited through interrogation, stating
broadly that “[t]he jury should also be instructed that the statements were
obtained under circumstances that support a conclusion that the statements are
reliable.” Id.
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mistreatment and torture of some detainees in U.S. custody.75
Other indictments were likewise sought for CIA members
allegedly involved in the use of extraordinary rendition.76
Similarly, a former detainee launched a civil complaint against
current Berkeley law professor John Yoo—a former official in the
U.S. Department of Justice—in San Francisco, alleging that he was
tortured during his interrogations by the U.S. military.77 In that
suit, the former detainee claims that the torture he suffered was
carried out pursuant to a policy that Yoo and then Assistant
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee advocated to the U.S. government in
a now infamous August 2002 memo.78
Such indictments and civil suits likewise reflect the swell of
criticism of U.S. terror prosecution policy in the War on Terror. As
this Comment argues below, a reexamination of the willful
blindness doctrine would be a valuable step in responding to and
addressing such criticism, by helping to restore the procedural
integrity of the U.S. terror prosecution paradigm.
3.

WILLFUL BLINDNESS AND KNOWLEDGE

As previously alluded to, willful blindness is a theory of
liability predicated on knowledge. Put another way, willful
blindness is a way of convicting those accused of offenses
75 See Adam Zagorin, Exclusive: Charges Sought Against Rumsfeld Over Prison
Abuse, TIME, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,1557842,00.html (describing charges against Donald Rumsfeld).
76 See id. (discussing then-ongoing investigations in Germany, Italy and
Spain).
77 Complaint, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 08-0035 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008); see also
Adam Liptak, Padilla Sues U.S. Lawyer Over Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, at
A9 (discussing Padilla’s suit and its theoretical underpinnings attributing
accomplice liability to Yoo for “[giving] the green light to clearly illegal conduct”);
Mike Rosen-Molina, Padilla Sues Law Professor Who Helped Frame Bush ‘Torture’
Policy
(Jan.
4,
2008),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/01
/padilla-sues-law-professor-who-helped.php (describing Padilla’s lawsuit and
Yoo’s background).
78 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj
/bybee80102mem.pdf (examining standards for conducting interrogations under
U.S. law implementing the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment). The memo was the subject of
vociferous condemnation by human rights advocates. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST,
GONZALES
ON
TORTURE
(Dec.
9,
2004),
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.com/us_law/etn/gonzales/briefs/brief
_20041209_Gonz_%20Tort.pdf (criticizing the legal accuracy of the Bybee memo).
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requiring a mens rea of knowledge. Thus, this Section begins by
analyzing the concept of willful blindness as knowledge in U.S.
criminal law, and introducing the potential problems the doctrine
creates if abused. The Section continues by briefly examining the
concept of knowledge from a philosophical perspective, also
discussing its relation to understanding. In doing so, this analysis
introduces one potential problem implicated by an overbroad
willful blindness doctrine: the imputation of knowledge to a
defendant without adequate understanding of the defendant (or
that defendant’s actual knowledge) by the factfinder. The Section
concludes by examining the international criminal law concept of
joint criminal enterprise liability—a doctrine which both
encompasses and expands willful blindness—to demonstrate the
dangerous extremes to which overinclusive interpretation of
willful blindness can extend if left unchecked.
3.1. Theory of Willful Blindness in U.S. Criminal Law
Several theories have been posited as to the underlying roots of
willful blindness.79 Many have conceptualized willful blindness as
a theory of knowledge in itself.80 In this view, some conceive of the
willfully blind defendant as having deliberately avoided
knowledge of a fact or circumstance in a conscious effort to avoid
liability for having such knowledge.81 Others offer a similar yet
distinct interpretation, conceiving of the willfully blind defendant
as actually knowing of at least a strong probability that the given
79 See United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(discussing various theories for willful blindness liability).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 148 (3d Cir. 2005) (referring
to the “willful blindness theory of knowledge”); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228
F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that willful blindness is a “subjective state of
mind that is deemed to satisfy the scienter requirement of knowledge”) (quoting
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 808 (3d Cir. 1994)).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 917, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (clarifying the requirement of deliberate action for conviction under
willful blindness theory, and approving the use of a two-factor test to determine
when to issue a willful blindness instruction); United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d
647, 651–52 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a willful blindness jury instruction
“should not be given unless there is evidence to support the inference that the
defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question
and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a
defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.”) (quoting United States v.
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Heredia, 429
F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 2005) (3-judge panel decision) (requiring that the
government prove the required inferences with “specific evidence”).
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inculpatory fact or circumstance exists, and then taking deliberate
action to avoid confirming that strong probability.82 In other
words, these latter theorists treat the willfully blind defendant as
knowing that an inculpatory fact or circumstance is highly likely
and taking conscious steps to avoid directly observing proof of it,
in order to avoid making that likelihood a certainty.83 Still others
have conceptualized willful blindness slightly differently, by
identifying willful blindness as a kind of substitute for
knowledge.84 A variation on this latter theme refers to willful
blindness as a means by which knowledge is understood or
implied.85
For purposes of this Comment, though, willful blindness can
perhaps best be sufficiently understood as the conscious or
deliberate avoidance of culpable knowledge—an avoidance which
is equally punishable for acquiring positive culpable knowledge.86
3.1.1.

Knowledge and Understanding

As it is in the law, the search for knowledge and truth is also an
The examination of the
ageless philosophical pursuit.87

82 Heredia, 429 F.3d at 824–25 (“The purpose of the Jewell [willful blindness]
instruction is to correct for those cases of ‘willful blindness,’ where the defendant
‘suspects a fact, realizes its probability, but refrains from obtaining final
confirmation in order to be able to deny knowledge if apprehended.’” (quoting
United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1992)).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating
that the “central point” of an ostrich instruction is that a person who has enough
knowledge to prompt an investigation and then avoids further knowledge has
sufficient knowledge to justify conviction).
84 See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: ‘Willful Blindness’ as an Alternative to
Proving Knowledge, 21 CHAMPION 45, 46 (1997) (criticizing a dissenting judge’s
advocacy of using a willful blindness instruction in a case where no objective or
subjective evidence of defendant’s guilt was presented as “dangerous reasoning
[that] flies in the face of the realities in the legal tax and accounting fields”).
85 See Edward J. Krauland and Aaron R. Hutman, Money Laundering
Enforcement and Policy, 38 INT’L LAW. 509, 514 n.33 (2004) (“It is well established
that U.S. courts, where necessary, may apply a conscious avoidance or willful
blindness standard to the knowledge element under the U.S. criminal anti-money
laundering statutes . . . .”).
86 See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702–03 (9th Cir. 1976)
(“‘[K]nowingly’ in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but
includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge only
because he consciously avoided it.”).
87 Some have gone so far as to claim the search for knowledge is rooted in
natural law. See ARISTOTLE, THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE 1 (John H. M’Mahon
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components and limits of knowledge has consumed philosophers
and scholars alike.88
Numerous thinkers have stressed the
importance of education and understanding in achieving
knowledge,89 a view that has become virtually axiomatic over
time.90 With relevance to the subject of this Comment, under this
view, the relationship of knowledge to understanding may have
particular salience, in that a factfinder may use willful blindness to
determine that a defendant knew of an inculpatory fact or
deliberately avoided knowing that fact, while the factfinder may
arguably lack sufficient specific understanding of the defendant’s
background and belief system to impose such knowledge to him.
Alternatively, other thinkers have disagreed with the focus on
education for achieving knowledge,91 stressing the importance of a
more experiential basis for understanding.92 Similarly, some have
posited that one’s experiences are not simply the mechanisms by
which one attains knowledge, but the endpoints of one’s ability to
know and understand.93 Thus, this latter view likewise suggests a
possible cultural obstacle to understanding and knowing another,94
trans., H.G. Bohn 1857) (“All men by nature are actuated with the desire of
knowledge . . . .”).
88 See, e.g., DIOGENES LAËRTIUS, THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT
PHILOSOPHERS 69 (Charles Duke Yonge trans., H.G. Bohn 1853) (“[Socrates] used
also to say . . . that he knew nothing, except the fact of his ignorance.”).
89 See, e.g., Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1729, 1730 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W.
D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press 198) (1984) (“Now each man judges well the
things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been
educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has
received an all-round education is a good judge in general.”).
90 See generally FRANK HERBERT, GOD EMPEROR OF DUNE 163 (Berkley Books,
1984) (1981) (“[T]he beginning of knowledge [is] the discovery of something we
do not understand.”).
91 See, e.g., Heraclitus, Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature, fragment XVI, in THE
FRAGMENTS OF THE WORK OF HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS ON NATURE 84, 88 (W.H.S.
Jones trans., Press of Isaac Friedenwald 1888) (“Much learning does not teach one
to have understanding. . . .”).
92 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 61
(J.F. Dove 1690) (1828) (“Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? . . .
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one
word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it
ultimately derives itself.”).
93 See id. at 68 (“No man’s knowledge . . . can go beyond his experience.”).
94 See generally Brian Caterino, Power and Interpretation in MAKING POLITICAL
SCIENCE MATTER: DEBATING KNOWLEDGE, RESEARCH, AND METHOD 137 (Sanford
Schram & Brian Caterino eds., NYU Press 2006) (“Neo-Aristotelians limit the
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which may limit the factfinder’s ability to accurately impute
culpable knowledge to a defendant. Such views, of course, do not
necessarily indicate a dichotomy in the paths to knowledge;
instead, it suffices for the purposes of this Comment to note that
multiple avenues for attaining knowledge have been suggested,
some focusing on education, and other focusing on the importance
of direct experience. Both avenues are particularly relevant to the
concept of willful blindness (and knowledge generally), as they
highlight some potential limitations on U.S. factfinders’ ability to
adequately establish terror defendants’ liability for offenses
requiring a finding of knowledge.
3.2. U.S. Legal Rule on Willful Blindness
The legal rule governing when a willful blindness instruction
may be given to a jury may be concisely summarized as follows: a
willful blindness instruction is properly given when the jury could
find a) that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high
probability of the existence of a fact or circumstance, and b) that
the defendant deliberately acted (or “closed his eyes”) to avoid
inculpatory knowledge of that fact or circumstance.95
Courts have repeatedly made clear that willful blindness is to
be evaluated from the subjective viewpoint of the defendant, rather
than from the objective view of a reasonable person in the
defendant’s situation.96 Courts similarly require evidence of the
horizon of the social world to the boundaries of a given culture or ethos shared by
members of a community.”).
95 See United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 652–54 (3d Cir. 2006); United
States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that evidence
supported a jury instruction on willful blindness in case where defendants sold
repossessed vehicles at above market prices); United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d
112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (supporting a willful blindness jury instruction); United
States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing when willful
blindness applies).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating
that “the judge’s version of the deliberate ignorance instruction must make clear
that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high probability of the
fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of
the probability.” (internal quotations omitted)); Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 508 (willful
blindness instructions are proper when the defendant was “subjectively aware of
the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man
would have been aware of the probability.” (quoting Stewart, 185 F.3d at 126));
United States v. Oppong, 165 F. App’x 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding drug
trafficking conviction where “the District Court properly focused on the
defendants’ subjective awareness”).
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defendant’s particularized deliberate avoidance before giving a
willful blindness instruction to the jury.97 Such evidence may take
the form of “overt physical acts” or “purely psychological
avoidance,” the latter defined as “a cutting off of one’s normal
curiosity by effort of the will.”98 Perhaps predictably, courts have
struggled to define the parameters for psychological acts of
avoidance,99 while others have resisted the physical/psychological
dichotomization altogether.100
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that this
subjective awareness requirement is supplemented (or arguably
undermined) by allowing juries to rely upon “reasonable
Predictably, courts have
inferences” from the evidence.101
struggled to define the boundaries of reasonable inferences,
acknowledging the potential problems of their elasticity.102
Moreover, some courts’ efforts to rein in the dangers of cascading
inferences are frustrated by the settled principle that circumstantial
evidence may also support a reasonable inference of knowledge.103
97 See, e.g., United States v. Stout, No. 89-317-1-2-3, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12343, at *105–06 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1990) (holding ostrich instruction proper on
remand for mail fraud defendant where evidence showed he acted willful by
refusing to consider motions to limit his authority at executive board meetings
and refusing to discuss certain expenditures, thus deliberately avoiding learning
of his actual lack of authority).
98 United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006). The Third
Circuit has upheld ostrich instructions regarding deliberate ignorance based on
the same two categories of evidence, but it has not specifically identified the
categories as such. See, e.g., United States v. Wasserson, 418 F.3d 225, 237–39 (3d
Cir. 2005); United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005).
99 The Seventh Circuit attempted to clarify the contours of the psychological
avoidance category by stating that the cutting off of one’s “normal curiosity” must
be a deliberate act rather than passive omission. See Leahy, 464 F.3d at 796
(acknowledging while there are difficulties in “distinguishing between the cutting
off of one’s curiosity and a simple lack of effort,” the latter is not punishable).
100 See, e.g., Wasserson, 418 F.3d at 237–39 (discussing the defendant’s willful
blindness as evidenced by physical acts and psychological avoidance without
expressly defining each category as distinct).
101 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994) (stating that
a jury may determine the defendant’s culpable knowledge by “drawing
reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant’s conduct”).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Bycer, 593 F.2d 549, 550 (3d Cir. 1979)
(“Inferences from established facts are accepted methods of proof when no direct
evidence is available. It is essential, however, that there be a logical and
convincing connection between the facts established and the conclusion
inferred.”).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000)
(stating that circumstantial evidence may support a jury’s inference of defendant’s
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Other courts, however, have been less reticent about expanding the
doctrine’s reach with regard to inferential proof,104 arguably
exacerbating the problem of the doctrine’s current overbreadth.
3.2.1.

Willfulness Versus Negligence

At its heart, liability under willful blindness requires a mens
rea of willfulness or knowledge.105 This requirement precludes
liability for lesser mental states such as recklessness or
negligence.106 Thus, willful blindness requires that the accused be
subjectively aware of the inculpatory fact or circumstance, rather
than that an objective hypothetical “reasonable person” would
have or should have known of the same.107 Stated another way,
merely showing that a defendant should have known a fact or
guilt, but that such an inference is reasonable only if the conclusion probably
flows from facts, rather than where jury engages in speculation and conjecture
leading to a mere guess or possibility).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 191 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986)
(expressing approval of a model jury instruction that includes the sentence: “[i]t is
entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing of the eyes, and
the inference to be drawn from any such evidence.”).
105 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (defining “knowingly” as a
culpable mental state); id. § 2.02(8) (“Requirement of Wilfulness [sic] Satisfied by
Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully [sic] is
satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the
offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.”); see also id.
106 See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 4, at 223–24 (“As Jewell emphasized,
however, the concept of willful blindness does not reduce the mens rea
requirement of criminal offenses: ‘The substantive justification for the rule is that
deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable.’ To be
convicted of a crime under a willful blindness theory, a defendant must still act
consciously to evade conditions that might create criminal liability. Accordingly,
willful blindness involves a higher level of criminal intent than mere negligence
or recklessness. As the Third Circuit has explained: ‘[T]he mainstream conception
of willful blindness [is that it is] a state of mind of much greater culpability than
simple negligence or recklessness, and more akin to knowledge.’ Therefore, when
individuals are willfully blind, they can be said to have acted culpably, and to
punish them for offenses requiring conscious criminal intent comports with the
hierarchical design of scienter in the criminal law.” (citations omitted)); see also
Recent Cases, Ninth Circuit Holds That Motive Is Not an Element of Willful Blindness,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2008) (arguing that current willful blindness
doctrine improperly “occupies a nebulous position between the mens rea
standards of knowledge and recklessness”); see generally MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2) (defining and separating four levels of culpability for those who act
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently).
107 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (explaining that if a defendant
satisfies a culpable mental state for an element of an offense, such a mental state
also satisfies material elements requiring lesser levels of culpability).
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circumstance at issue is insufficient to sustain a conviction for an
offense requiring a mens rea of knowledge or willfulness, and thus
the same showing is insufficient to permit convicting a defendant
based on willful blindness. The same logic applies to the second
element of willful blindness, requiring that the defendant act
deliberately to avoid culpable knowledge.
3.2.2.

Increasingly Frequent Use and Expansion of the Doctrine in
U.S. Law

The use of willful blindness instructions has increased
dramatically in recent years.108 The increasingly frequent usage of
the instructions augments the potential for misunderstanding or
misconstruing the doctrine to have a wide impact. However, the
problems with the willful blindness doctrine are not only
quantitative, but qualitative as well, as courts have been willing to
expand the reach of the willful blindness doctrine to both an
increasing number and scope of crimes in recent years.
Perhaps the scope extension most salient to this Comment is
the newly approved application of the doctrine to cases involving
the crime of conspiracy,109 a frequent charge in terror trials. While

108 See, e.g., United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (listing numerous recent decisions using willful blindness instructions in a
wide range of cases).
109 For cases upholding the issuance of willful blindness instructions to the
jury in conspiracy cases despite defense arguments regarding their logical
inconsistency, see, for example, United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 479 (2d
Cir. 2003); United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1115 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1993). For definitions of
the crime of conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (defining the crime of
conspiracy as follows: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the
commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment
provided for such misdemeanor.”); United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860, 866 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that elements of conspiracy include proof of an agreement to
commit a crime, knowing participation by the defendant, and an overt act
committed in furtherance of the agreement); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)–(2)
(indicating that “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons
to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission”
and “knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has
conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime”). See also
Todd R. Russell & O. Carter Snead, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
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the dangers of overbroad construction of the willful blindness
doctrine extend to all charges requiring a mens rea of knowledge,
the specific application to conspiracy charges poses special risks to
defendants. Extending willful blindness to conspiracy charges
exponentially increases the overbreadth dangers of willful
blindness doctrine, as one may infer, a priori, the defendant’s
participation in the conspiracy by circumstantial evidence.110 This
danger is heightened further by a widely appreciated prosecutorial
affinity for conspiracy charges, and the relative ease with which
prosecutors regard conspiracy convictions, as opposed to other
charges.111
Combined with the permissibility of inferring
knowledge from circumstantial evidence, this presents a
potentially crippling scenario for defendants. Thus, the expansion
of willful blindness doctrine to conspiracy charges may compound
the dangers of overbreadth by allowing for convictions based on a
stream of cascading inferences which are improperly drawn by the
factfinder.
3.3. Willful Blindness in International Criminal Law: Joint Criminal
Enterprise
While this Comment has thus far discussed domestic law, the
criminalization of knowing or willful participation in criminal
activity is also common in international criminal law.112 As such,
REV. 739, 741–42 nn.14, 15 (1998) (discussing elements of federal conspiracy in
various circuits).
110 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (“Participation in a
criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose
and plan may be inferred from a ‘development and collocation of circumstances.’”
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839
(2d Cir. 1938)).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990)
(arguing that the appearance of a conspiracy charge against the defendant “is
inevitable because prosecutors seem to have conspiracy on their word processors
as Count I; rare is the case omitting such a charge”); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 948 (1987) (“[T]he
procedural and evidentiary consequences directly or indirectly associated with a
conspiracy charge make conspiracy charges attractive to prosecutors, and create
possibilities of abuse.”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307,
1310 n.4 (2003) (discussing the frequency of conspiracy charges being brought in
criminal trials). See also Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 137 (describing
conspiracy as the “darling of the U.S. prosecutor’s nursery”).
112 A representative example of this may be found in the U.N. Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, which reads in relevant part as follows:
Article 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group.
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international criminal law also tacitly accepts the theory of willful
blindness as encompassing crimes for which acting knowingly or
willfully is a material element of an offense. However, the concept
of willful blindness itself is largely eclipsed in international
jurisprudence by the more expansive doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise liability113 [hereinafter “JCE”]. As the reader will
quickly discern, the dangers of JCE—particularly its overbreadth—
largely mirror the dangers of overbroad willful blindness
jurisprudence. In this way, the discussion of JCE and its criticism
will inform our understanding of willful blindness, and specifically
will demonstrate how an extreme construction of willful blindness
can endanger a defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence.
Under the “implicit” theory of JCE,114 “an individual may be
held responsible for all crimes committed pursuant to the existence

1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when
committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct
from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal
activity:
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a
serious crime . . . ;
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the
aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal
group or its intention to commit the crimes in question,
takes an active part in:
a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group;
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in
the knowledge that his or her participation will
contribute to the achievement of the above-described
criminal aim;
(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or
counselling the commission of serious crime involving an
organized criminal group.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto art. 5(1), opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. No.
108-16, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
113 See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 50 (discussing the joint
criminal enterprise theory of liability and its prevalence in international law).
114 See id. at 103 (“The form of liability known as ‘joint criminal enterprise’ or
‘common plan’ is not explicitly described in the statute of the ICTY or ICTR,
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of a common plan or design . . . if the defendant participates with
others in the common design.”115 By way of explanation, three
broad categories of JCE liability have been articulated: (1) acting
with the same criminal intent pursuant to a common criminal
design;116 (2) knowingly participating in a “system[] of illtreatment” (such as a concentration camp);117 and, in the broadest
and most controversial category, (3) common liability for acts by
members of the enterprise which are “natural and foreseeable
consequence[s]” of the common design.118 The first and second
categories may be broadly analogized to a version of conspiracy in
U.S. law.119 However, the third category has much more farreaching consequences, extending liability to a defendant for
activities by other members done without that defendant’s
knowledge or consent, so long as the others’ activities or their
consequences were foreseeable (rather than that they were actually
foreseen, for example). Thus, whereas a proper construction of
willful blindness theoretically enables liability only for knowledge
and intent, JCE allows for liability for knowledge, recklessness,120
negligence, or even mere association121 with those involved in a
criminal enterprise. This latter scheme provides international

although the judges have found that it is implicitly included in the language of
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.”).
115 See id. (citing Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Judgement [sic], ICTY Appeals
Chamber, paras. 94–101, Case No. IT-98-32-A (Feb. 25, 2004)).
116 Id. at 105.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 106 (stating that a “defendant who intends to participate in a
common design may be found guilty of acts outside that design if such acts are a
‘natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose.’”
(quoting Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement [sic], ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 183,
Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999)).
119 For definitions of conspiracy, see sources cited in note 109, supra.
120 See Danner & Martinez supra note 50, at 102 (stating that under Article 7(1)
of the ICTY Statute and Article 6(1) of the ICTR statute a defendant may be found
liable for committing or planning to commit a crime if the defendant “intend[s] to
plan or . . . commit the crime or [is] ‘aware[] of the substantial likelihood that a
criminal act or omission would occur as a consequence of his conduct.’” (citing
Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Judgement [sic], ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 251, Case No.
IT-98-30/1-T (Nov. 2, 2001))).
121 See id. at 137 (discussing the potential for JCE defendants to be convicted
through guilt by association).
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prosecutors with a remarkably powerful weapon which some have
argued inequitably tips the scales against the accused.122
Additionally, those convicted under the JCE theory are subject
to punishment for all substantive acts of other members of the
criminal enterprise.123 Practitioners in the United States may liken
this to the concept of Pinkerton liability,124 whereby the U.S.
Supreme Court held that each co-conspirator may be held
criminally responsible for substantive criminal acts undertaken in
furtherance of the conspiracy.125 While such a framework of
liability has been sharply criticized and largely rejected in U.S.
law,126 some have defended the usefulness of JCE’s broader scope
in the uniquely complex context of international criminal law.127
122 Id. (“Joint criminal enterprise raises the specter of guilt by association and
provides ammunition to those who doubt the rigor and impartiality of the
international forum. If conspiracy is the darling of the U.S. prosecutor’s nursery,
then it is difficult to see how JCE can amount to anything less than the nuclear
bomb of the international prosecutor’s arsenal.”) (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 115.
124 See id. at 115–16 (discussing the similarity of JCE to the rejected U.S.
doctrine of Pinkerton liability); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives
Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1785–86 (2005) (“The final type of
participation involves criminal acts beyond the common design, but a natural and
foreseeable consequence of effecting it. This resembles U.S. rules on Pinkerton
conspiracies and felony murder and is therefore the most controversial expression
of the doctrine.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
125 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (“The governing
principle is the same when the substantive offense is committed by one of the
conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful project. . . . Each conspirator
instigated the commission of the crime. The unlawful agreement contemplated
precisely what was done. . . . [T]he overt act of one partner in crime is attributable
to all. . . . If that can be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why
the same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not
attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them responsible for the
substantive offense.” (citations omitted)).
126 The Pinkerton theory of liability for substantive acts of co-conspirators has
been strongly criticized and rejected by many state courts. See, e.g., Bolden v.
State, 124 P.3d 191, 198–99 (Nev. 2005) (stating that “the Pinkerton rule has
garnered significant disfavor” and describing rejection of the theory in several
states); see also Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 115–16 (“Today, many U.S.
states, as well as the influential Model Penal Code, have rejected Pinkerton
liability, although it still plays a prominent role in federal prosecutions.” (citing
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (7th ed. 2001)).
127 See Osiel, supra note 124, at 1786 (“Enterprise participation appeals to
international prosecutors for its reach beyond the formal military hierarchy to
civilian bosses and paramilitaries over whom no command is exercised. The
doctrine will also be valuable in reaching the many new private armies to which
states increasingly subcontract military work, including combat itself. The

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/6

2008]

WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE

725

Similarly to willful blindness in U.S. domestic courts, the use of
and reliance on JCE by international courts is on the rise.128
United States courts have not endorsed the concept of JCE
specifically, and some state courts have rejected doctrinal variants
of it.129 However, some scholars have alleged that the theories of
liability espoused in U.S. military commissions demonstrate
striking similarity to the doctrine.130 This alleged similarity should
thus inform discussion of the prosecutorial scheme employed in
the War on Terror against those accused of acts of international
terrorism. While JCE may not be specifically used in military
commissions, such criticism should cause us to examine the
dangers of overbreadth and guilt-by-association techniques which
may contribute to such prosecutions.
Additionally, it is
particularly poignant then that the JCE doctrine has been criticized
on substantially similar grounds to that of the willful blindness
doctrine,131 and likewise has been the subject of many calls for
reform.132
amplitude and elasticity of enterprise participation lets indictments transcend the
confines of a bureaucracy to the informal networks connecting it to other
individuals and organizations, often exercising greater power than many within.”
(citations omitted)).
128 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 107 (“Joint criminal enterprise is
becoming increasingly important at the ICTY. One indication of its centrality to
contemporary ICTY practice is the frequency with which recent indictments have
rested the accused’s liability on this basis.” (citation omitted)).
129 See, e.g., Oates v. State, 627 A.2d 555, 559 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (“Each
joint participant in a crime enjoys a unique level of blameworthiness that neither
controls nor is controlled by the level of blameworthiness of any other joint
participant.”).
130 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 80 (“The military commissions
instituted by the U.S. government to try suspected terrorists include both
command responsibility and a liability theory that closely resembles joint criminal
enterprise, and the first indictments of Guantanamo detainees implicitly rely on
this joint criminal enterprise theory of liability.” (citation omitted)).
131 Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 159, 167–76 (2007) (discussing perceived conflicts in JCE doctrine,
particularly with regard to the requisite level of culpability for conviction).
132 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 79 (“[I]f not limited
appropriately, [the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise liability has] the potential
to lapse into forms of guilt by association, thereby undermining the legitimacy
and the ultimate effectiveness of international criminal law. Doctrinal reforms
may help avoid this danger.”). One of the most frequently suggested reforms
includes adopting a substantial contribution requirement, thus requiring a
stronger showing of intent on the part of the defendant member of the criminal
enterprise, in order to minimize the risk of mere guilt by association. See, e.g.,
Jacob A. Ramer, Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for
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In the broader scheme, the United States has shown
ambivalence toward the applicability of international law concepts
in domestic courts. While the Supreme Court noted many years
ago that international law is part of U.S. law,133 some courts have
only recently embraced applying it in U.S. cases.134 The current
Supreme Court has been divided on the applicability of
international law to domestic cases.135 That division leaves the
applicability of specific international law concepts such as JCE in
flux going forward within the U.S. domestic prosecutorial scheme.
However, as alluded to earlier, the specific dangers of
overinclusive JCE jurisprudence internationally mirror the dangers
Persecution, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L COMP. L. 31, 110–12 (2007) (recommending the
addition of a substantial contribution requirement).
133 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice
of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.”).
134 See generally Associated Press, Supreme Court Justices Spar over International
Law, Jan. 18, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105364112559
(discussing Justice Scalia’s critique of U.S. judges relying on international law to
decide cases); BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 307 (discussing the Bush
administration’s antipathy toward customary international law and the
International Criminal Court). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635
(2006) (holding that military commissions at Guantanamo Bay violated Common
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention).
135 For an illustrative example of the competing arguments between Supreme
Court justices on the issue within a single case, compare Medellín v. Texas, No.
06-984, 2008 WL 3821478 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (per curiam) (arguing that
Congressional failure to properly “implement” the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations—a treaty to which the U.S. is a party—renders U.S. courts free
to disregard both it and an ICJ decision interpreting it in deciding whether a
violation of it justifies granting a convicted defendants’ request for a stay of
execution in part because the treaty “does not itself have the force and effect of
domestic law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence”) with
Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984, 2008 WL 3821478, *4 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (Breyer, J.
dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s failure to grant the defendants’ requested
stay of execution “places the United States irremediably in violation of
international law and breaks our treaty promises;” recommending that the Court
seek the views of the Solicitor General to determine the proper resolution of the
case). See also Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1359–67 (2008) (majority opinion)
(arguing that ICJ judgments are not “automatically enforceable” in U.S. courts
under the U.N. Charter, particularly where the underlying treaties giving rise to
the cause of action are not “self-executing”); id. at 1389 (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(arguing that “the United States’ treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ
judgment in Avena is enforceable in court in this case without further
congressional action beyond Senate ratification of the relevant treaties. . . . [T]he
ICJ judgment before us is judicially enforceable without further legislative
action.”).
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of overinclusive willful blindness jurisprudence domestically, and
are useful to inform any discussion of willful blindness. Thus,
while JCE is not specifically applied under the U.S. prosecution
scheme against terror defendants, the concerns and critiques that
have been lodged against the doctrine should inform our
evaluation of the willful blindness doctrine and the latter’s
application to such defendants.
4.

CRITICISM AND IMPROPER USE OF THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS
DOCTRINE

Several arguments strongly criticizing the willful blindness
doctrine exist, attacking it on multiple fronts. However, the central
practical criticism of the doctrine as it exists today is rooted in a
failure to properly explain its requirement of willfulness, and a
concurrent failure to distinguish willfulness from the lesser mens
rea of negligence. These failures have led to a confused doctrinal
application and the real threat of overinclusive convictions. These
critiques are relevant to one’s understanding of what willful
blindness is, how it may be improperly used, and how it ought to
be properly applied. Additionally, these critiques highlight some
of the problems and dangers of the willful blindness doctrine and
why, as this Comment argues, a reexamination of the doctrine is
essential to ensure that it is used properly, particularly in the cases
of those accused of acts of international terrorism.
This Section examines the confusion in current willful
blindness doctrine, focusing on the central problem of its failure to
effectively distinguish willfulness from negligence. The Section
then examines the related problem of overly complex jury
instructions on willful blindness. It concludes with some courts’
suggested approaches for reforming and limiting the willful
blindness doctrine.
4.1. Confusion Between Willfulness/Knowledge and Negligence
Judge Richard Posner eloquently identified what many have
found to be the central problematic issue posed by willful
blindness instructions, stating:
The most powerful criticism of the ostrich instruction is,
precisely, that its tendency is to allow juries to convict upon
a finding of negligence for crimes that require intent. The
criticism can be deflected by thinking carefully about just
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what it is that real ostriches do . . . . They are not merely
careless birds. They bury their heads in the sand so that
they will not see or hear bad things. They deliberately avoid
acquiring unpleasant knowledge. The ostrich instruction is
designed for cases in which there is evidence that the
defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is
involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he
does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and
extent of those dealings. A deliberate effort to avoid guilty
knowledge is all the guilty knowledge the law requires.136
As Judge Posner implies, while willful blindness is meant to
permit convictions for those who make a “deliberate effort” to
avoid inculpatory knowledge, if the factfinder does not properly
appreciate the distinction between the deliberate actor and the
negligent actor—the distinction between the ostrich who buries his
head in the sand and the merely “careless birds”—that confusion
may lead factfinders to convict the latter improperly. Posner also
suggests that for a willful blindness conviction to occur, the
factfinder must determine that the defendant is more like the
ostrich—the defendant “takes steps” to deliberately avoid culpable
knowledge—than a careless bird, who ought to have known the
culpable fact or circumstance but did not. In short, a factfinder
who misconstrues the proper meaning of willful blindness liability
by failing to fully understand that distinction may improperly
convict a defendant for a knowledge-based offense when the
defendant was merely negligent. Numerous scholars have echoed
this criticism.137
136 United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted) (reversing gambling conviction in part due to an improper willful
blindness instruction).
137 See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Holds That Motive Is Not an Element of Willful
Blindness, supra note 106, at 1249–50 (“An instruction that does not distinguish
between more and less culpable forms of willful blindness lowers the underlying
crime’s mens rea standard from knowledge to recklessness, potentially leading to
unfair convictions.”); Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and
Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2248 (1993) (“[A] jury may indeed interpret
deliberate ignorance to mean that the defendant may be convicted because she
should have known the fact—i.e., a negligence standard . . . . [A]llowing a jury
instruction that facilitates conviction only when the government presents a
weaker case.” (emphasis omitted)); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction:
Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 227–
31 (1990) (criticizing willful blindness instructions’ tendency to permit convictions
for offenses requiring willfulness with mere proof of negligence).
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This confusion or conflation between knowledge and
negligence is perhaps the central fault line demonstrating how the
willful blindness doctrine, when misconstrued overbroadly, poses
real dangers to defendants of overinclusive convictions. This
concern is particularly heightened where the conviction of a terror
defendant often results in execution.
The consequences of
improperly lowering the mens rea for an offense may be dire for
defendants, who may be unjustly convicted of offenses based on
that impropriety. What this means is that a misconstrual of willful
blindness which does not clearly outline the requirements of
willfulness versus negligence risks the conviction and subsequent
execution of those who are merely negligent, but are charged with
acts requiring knowledge. While this concern applies with special
relevance to terror trials, it is clear that the problem of improper
convictions based on misconstrual of doctrinal mens rea
requirements is one that should be examined in other contexts as
well.
4.1.1.

Complexity of Willful Blindness Jury Instructions

Courts and scholars have identified numerous reasons for the
problem of improperly overbroad and misunderstood application
of willful blindness liability. One key factor contributing to this
problem is undoubtedly that of virtually incomprehensible jury
instructions on willful blindness.
Often delivered in
extraordinarily complex legalese, such jury instructions may often
be of little use to a lay juror, who arguably cannot be expected to
comprehend the subtle distinctions obscured by such language.
Two representative examples help illustrate this point. First,
the Eighth Circuit’s model jury instruction on willful blindness
states in relevant part, “[t]he element of knowledge may be
inferred if the defendant deliberately closed [his] eyes to what
would otherwise have been obvious . . . . You may not find the
defendant acted ‘knowingly’ if you find he/she was merely
negligent, careless or mistaken.”138 Second, the Seventh Circuit’s
model instruction on knowledge tells jurors that to act
“knowingly” means “that the defendant realized what he was
doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act
138 JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 7.04 (2006) [hereinafter 8TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS] (citations and
internal brackets omitted).
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through ignorance, mistake or accident.”139 The Seventh Circuit
further instructs that a juror “may infer knowledge from a
combination of suspicion and indifference . . . . If you find that a
person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they
seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet
shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude
that he acted knowingly.”140 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit
instruction never mentions the phrase willful blindness or its
equivalents; instead, it subsumes the concept into the general
ambit of knowledge.
While such instructions mention the distinction between
willfulness and negligence, it is at least doubtful that the lay juror
will understand that distinction absent further explanation. Such
obtuse language assumes knowledge of legal subtleties rarely
shared by lay-jurors. Similarly, while the above instructions do
mention the exceptions of negligence and mistake, they bury the
concepts in jargon and the passive voice. As a result, the
instruction may fail to convey the subtle distinction between
inferential knowledge and negligence to lay jurors, thus rendering
it largely ineffective in promoting a proper application of the
willful blindness theory.141
One may take solace in the fact that judges have discretion in
altering the language of a model jury instruction.142 Nonetheless,
judges may be swayed by the legislature’s ironic commentary that
model instructions are drafted with the intention of being “clear,
brief and simple instructions calculated to maximize jury
139 COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT §
4.06 (1998) [hereinafter 7TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS].
140 Id.
141 Some have gone so far as to argue that willful blindness instructions
which are constructed or issued inappropriately may implicate violations of a
defendant’s constitutional rights. See Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax
Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1482 (1991)
(criticizing appellate courts that affirm convictions such as those with willful
blindness instructions based on insufficient circumstantial evidence, saying,
“[a]ffirming such convictions thus seems ‘fair’ in a moral sense. But it is not fair
in a constitutional sense”).
142 See 8TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 138, at introductory note (“These are
intended to be model, not mandatory, instructions and should be modified as
appropriate to more clearly and precisely present issues to the jury.”); see also
United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987) (“It is . . . within the
sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the particular language to be
employed when charging the jury.” (citations omitted)).
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While some have scoffed at such an
comprehension.”143
assertion,144 evidence suggests that judges often rely upon model
instructions.145 Alternatively, some have argued the willful
blindness doctrine has become so muddled that judges themselves
confuse the mens rea requirement,146 resulting in an ambiguous
formulation of instructions designed at their discretion.147 With
these factors in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts’
individualized instructions have done little to remedy the
complexity problem.148
Some courts have attempted to add clarity to jury instructions
on willful blindness. One such example, upheld by the Third
Circuit in 2006 in United States v. Oppong, stated:
[T]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences
from the proof that the defendant deliberately closed his
eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him.
143 See 8TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 138, at introductory note (“We
recognize that the manner of instructing a jury varies widely among judges, but
these models are offered as clear, brief and simple instructions calculated to
maximize jury comprehension.”).
144 See Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law is No Excuse
(Killed by Money, Guns and a Little Sex), 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 635, 665
(1999) (citing imprecise drafting as a principal cause of the confusion over proper
application of the willful blindness doctrine).
145 See, e.g., 7TH CIR. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 139, § 4.06 committee comment
(listing numerous cases approving the model instruction).
146 See Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1351, 1382–90 (1992) (discussing confusion over the willful blindness doctrine
and stating that “most definitions of wilful ignorance delineate a mens rea that is
the equivalent neither of knowledge nor recklessness”).
147 See Marcus, supra note 137, at 2257 (discussing courts’ confused
understandings of the concept of knowledge as contributing to problematic
application of the “vague and misleading notion of conscious avoidance”).
148 See, e.g., United States v. de los Santos, 163 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent of defendants to avoid
knowledge or enlightenment would permit the jury to find knowledge. Stated in
another way, a person’s knowledge of a particular fact may be shown from a
deliberate or intentional blindness to the existence of that fact.”); United States v.
Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 191 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming fraud conviction, while
proposing that future Seventh Circuit juries be instructed that “[a] finding beyond
a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit
an inference of knowledge.”); United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 461–62
(4th Cir. 1994) (“If you find that the defendant or defendants did not learn about
the true nature of an existing fact . . . deliberately . . . for the very purpose of being
able to assert ignorance at a later time, then you may infer and find that he had
the full equivalent of knowledge because one’s self-imposed ignorance cannot
protect him from criminal liability.”).
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In other words, you may find such knowledge established
if you find that the defendant was aware of the high
probability of the existence of a fact and failed to take action
to determine whether or not it was true. The defendant
cannot be convicted for being stupid, negligent, or
mistaken. More is required . . . . In short, if the evidence
shows that the defendant did not know, then he must be
acquitted. If the evidence indicates that he was very
stupid . . . or ignorant, then he cannot be convicted. But if
the evidence shows that there was a high probability that
the defendant himself knew something was amiss and that
he acted with deliberate disregard for a high probability
that illegal activity was occurring, then you may find that
the defendant had guilty knowledge . . . .149
Here, the court makes a commendable effort to craft a legally
sufficient instruction in plainer language which is more accessible
to a juror, while clearly spelling out the necessary mens rea
distinctions. While the instruction still maintains some complexity
initially, it appears to make strong strides toward simplification in
the end, thereby assisting the factfinder in understanding the issue.
Critics may argue, however, that countervailing problems are
implicated by oversimplification; plainer language in a willful
blindness instruction may obscure subtle distinction at the expense
of general comprehensibility.
For example, the Oppong
instruction’s sentence regarding the defendant’s failure to take
action may undesirably blur the distinction between acts and
omissions.
Similarly, some may argue that the instruction
implicitly dilutes the knowledge requirement, holding the
defendant liable simply for knowing “something was amiss” rather
than for deliberately avoiding inculpatory knowledge.150 While
these criticisms are valid, the plain-language approach employed
149 165 F. App’x 155, 162 n.5, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding drug trafficking
conviction based on willful blindness theory where “the District Court properly
focused on the defendants’ subjective awareness”).
150 The appellant in Oppong argued this very point. Nonetheless, the Third
Circuit upheld the instruction, noting that it had previously upheld similar
wording and related variations. Id. (citing United States v. Titchell, 261 F.3d 348,
351 (3d Cir. 2001) (wording the portion of instruction as “deliberate disregard of
the truth”); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1985) (wording
the portion of instruction as “high probability that he knew something was
amiss”)).
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in the Oppong instruction is at least a small step forward in
addressing the problem of comprehensibility.
4.2. Court Criticisms and Suggested Reforms
Some courts have resisted the trend of increased reliance on
willful blindness instructions by questioning the doctrine or
recommending reforms. While some of these courts have done
little more than acknowledge skepticism regarding the doctrine,151
others have posited that logical inconsistencies in the theory and
doctrine render it largely questionable.152
Such arguments may prove instructive to a reexamination of
the doctrine of willful blindness. However, it is important to note
that these criticisms do not necessarily imply that the concept of
willful blindness is inherently flawed. As this Comment argues,
the need to provide a framework for liability for those who act
deliberately to avoid culpable knowledge is real, but so too is the
need to ensure that such a framework does not improperly ensnare
those with lesser states of culpability.
Other courts have suggested broader limitations on willful
blindness instructions which may potentially improve the doctrine
going forward. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Heredia153 acknowledged the “vexing thicket of precedent”
regarding willful blindness and sought to clarify its scope.154 As a
151 United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 223, 265–66 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (referring to
the willful blindness doctrine as a “legal fiction”).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 337, 337 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (“It makes obvious sense to say that a person cannot act ‘knowingly’ if
she does not know what is going on. To add that such a person nevertheless acts
‘knowingly’ if she intentionally does not know what is going on is something else
again. . . . [I]t is hard to see how ignorance, from whatever cause, can be
knowledge.”); Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance,
Knowledge, and the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the
Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 52 (1994) (“[I]t is hard to see how
ignorance, from whatever cause, can be knowledge. A particular explanation of
why a defendant remains ignorant might justify treating him as though he had
knowledge, but it cannot, through some mysterious alchemy, convert ignorance
into knowledge.”); THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, com. to
instr. 5.06 (“Other circuits have recognized that the willful blindness instruction is
problematic, because it seems inconsistent to say that awareness can be proved by
evidence that the defendant avoided awareness . . . .”).
153 United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
154 Id. at 919 (“Here, we recognize that many of our post-Jewell cases have
created a vexing thicket of precedent that has been difficult for litigants to follow
and for district courts—and ourselves—to apply with consistency. But, rather
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preliminary matter, the court stated that willful blindness
instructions should be given only rarely, and at a judge’s discretion
after a specific factual inquiry.155 The court then distinguished the
propriety of a willful blindness instruction versus an instruction on
the defendant’s actual knowledge, stating that a judge should only
issue a willful blindness instruction where the jury has rejected the
government’s claim of actual knowledge, or where they could
rationally distinguish between actual knowledge and willful
blindness.156 Additionally, the court stated that willful blindness
instructions should only be used when the government presents
evidence that: (1) the defendant had actual suspicion of
involvement in a crime; and (2) the defendant deliberately avoided
verifying such suspicions.157
Curiously, however, the full Ninth Circuit appeared to
minimize concerns raised by the previous panel decision regarding
the risks of unjust convictions for negligence158 and overinclusive
than overturn Jewell, we conclude that the better course is to clear away the
underbrush that surrounds it.”).
155 Id. at 924 n.16 (discussing precedent stating that willful blindness
instructions should be given rarely, but specifying that such precedent does not
create a separate substantive restriction on the doctrine).
156 Id. at 922 (“When knowledge is at issue in a criminal case, the court must
first determine whether the evidence of defendant’s mental state, if viewed in the
light most favorable to the government, will support a finding of actual
knowledge. If so, the court must instruct the jury on this theory. Actual
knowledge, of course, is inconsistent with willful blindness. The deliberate
ignorance instruction only comes into play, therefore, if the jury rejects the
government’s case as to actual knowledge. In deciding whether to give a willful
blindness instruction, in addition to an actual knowledge instruction, the district
court must determine whether the jury could rationally find willful blindness
even though it has rejected the government’s evidence of actual knowledge. If so,
the court may also give a Jewell instruction.”).
157 Id. at 919–20; accord United States v. Inv. Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 268 (5th
Cir. 1993) (expounding substantially the same rule). The full Ninth Circuit in
Heredia overruled a third element suggested by the Circuit’s previous three-judge
panel ruling which would have additionally required a showing that the
defendant deliberately avoided acquiring inculpatory knowledge with the intent
to avoid prosecution. Heredia, 483 F.3d at 920–21; see also Ninth Circuit Holds That
Motive Is Not an Element of Willful Blindness, supra note 106 (criticizing the en banc
Ninth Circuit’s overruling of the motive prong).
158 Compare Heredia, 483 F.3d at 923 (“We do not share the worry, expressed in
some of our cases, that giving both an actual knowledge and a deliberate
ignorance instruction is likely to confuse the jury.”) with United States v. Heredia,
429 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 2005) (3-judge panel decision) (citing United States v.
Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1988)) (“The instruction should therefore be
rarely given because of the risk that the jury will convict on a standard of
negligence: that the defendant should have known the conduct was illegal.”
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abuse. The en banc Ninth Circuit specifically stated that, “[a] jury
is presumed to follow the instructions given to it, and we see no
reason to fear that juries will be less able to do so when trying to
sort out a criminal defendant’s state of mind than any other
issue.”159 A previous three-judge panel of the court was far less
optimistic on the latter points, stating that “[t]he government may
not request a [willful blindness] instruction to close the gaps in its
case. . . . If we were to permit the issuance of the [willful
blindness] instruction absent specific evidence that the defendant
ignored the truth in order to provide herself with a defense, the
deliberate ignorance doctrine in this circuit would slide perilously
close to negligence or even strict liability.”160
The concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit above should be
particularly instructive to a reexamination of the willful blindness
doctrine in the current context. Despite the en banc Ninth Circuit’s
criticism, the risk of confusion between actual knowledge and
willful blindness should be considered by judges before issuing a
willful blindness instruction. In addition, such instructions should
contain a clear, plain-language distinction between deliberate,
willful avoidance and mere negligence. Such instructions should
make absolutely clear that the former satisfies the knowledge
requirement in willful blindness, whereas the latter cannot.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, such concerns of
mens rea confusion amongst jurors must be addressed and
remedied if the doctrine is to maintain its proper purpose in
convicting only those who acted willfully. These concerns of
overinclusiveness and excessive prosecutorial zeal are particularly
acute in light of other substantive and procedural restrictions
already acting on those accused of acts of international terrorism in
the current U.S. prosecutorial scheme.

(internal quotes omitted, emphasis in original)). The full Ninth Circuit in Heredia
did, however, amend the panel decision to clearly spell out the differences
between the various culpable mental states. 483 F.3d at 917 (amending footnote in
previous panel opinion to read: “As our cases have recognized, deliberate
ignorance, otherwise known as willful blindness, is categorically different from
negligence or recklessness. A willfully blind defendant is one who took deliberate
actions to avoid confirming suspicions of criminality. A reckless defendant is one
who merely knew of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct was
criminal; a negligent defendant is one who should have had similar suspicions
but, in fact, did not.” (citations omitted)).
159 Heredia, 483 F.3d at 923.
160 429 F.3d at 825, 830.
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SPECIFIC DANGERS OF THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE IN
THE WAR ON TERROR

As one writer has argued, the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks brought the dangers of terrorism into our collective
consciousness, while simultaneously raising the countervailing
danger of reacting to terrorism with corrosive or overinclusive
policies.161 In light of the domestic and international criticism
noted above, this Section argues that the U.S. government has
underappreciated that danger in the prosecutorial scheme of the
War on Terror. With these concerns in mind, reexamination and
restraint of the willful blindness doctrine would be a small step
toward addressing the danger of such overreaching, and thus
toward improving the procedural propriety of our legal system. In
short, this Section argues in part that because detainees’ procedural
rights are largely abrogated through adjudicative mechanisms of
the War on Terror, improper use of the willful blindness doctrine
may serve to abrogate the mens rea requirements used to convict
them as well. Doing so unduly undermines the legitimacy of the
legal process, and thus the perceived legitimacy of U.S. terror
prosecutions and foreign policy.
As a result, this Section
recommends both reexamination and more cautious application of
the willful blindness doctrine as a small step toward reform,
focusing on danger specific to (though not exclusive to) defendants
in the War on Terror.
This Section examines specific arguments for reexamining the
willful blindness doctrine with regard to detainees. These reasons
include the dangers of overinclusive convictions, the limitations of
knowledge and understanding by factfinders, the finality of
execution as punishment, and the potential use of the doctrine in a
coercive manner. The Section concludes with a discussion of
potential critical responses to these arguments.
5.1. Overinclusiveness
An unduly broad application of the willful blindness doctrine
raises the real threat of overinclusive convictions. Specifically, by

161 BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 35 (“Since September 11, 2001, we in the United
States, and elsewhere have been caused to face not only the dangers of expected
terrorism against us, but we must also face dangers associated with possible
implementation of reactive draconian criminal laws, procedures, and methods
that risk eroding our values, our protections, and liberties.” (citations omitted)).
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confusing or improperly lowering the mens rea required to convict
a defendant, misconstrual of the willful blindness doctrine creates
the risk that defendants may be convicted for offenses requiring
knowledge, where they did not have the requisite knowledge as
defined by law. This, at the simplest level, could thus result in
convictions of defendants for offenses they did not commit. More
largely, this could exacerbate the expansion of the willful blindness
doctrine beyond the confines of offenses requiring willfulness.
At worst, use of the doctrine as currently misconstrued risks
penalizing terror defendants for mere association162 with
blameworthy persons, and doing so at the same level as knowing
or intentional participants.163 Guilt by association is insufficient to
convict criminal defendants, including even for conspiracy
charges.164 As a result, it would be plainly improper to use the
willful blindness doctrine to convict defendants who did not
possess the requisite knowledge. Properly narrow construction of
the doctrine is necessary to avoid that impropriety.
More narrowly, as discussed above, failure to reform the
current doctrine may result in the improper conflation of
willfulness with negligence.165 Some judicial rhetoric indicates that

162 See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 79 (“[I]f not limited
appropriately, [the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise liability has] the potential
to lapse into forms of guilt by association, thereby undermining the legitimacy
and the ultimate effectiveness of international criminal law. Doctrinal reforms
may help avoid this danger.”).
163 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (defining and separating four
levels of culpability for those who act purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently).
164 See United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[M]ere
association with conspirators or those involved in a criminal enterprise is
insufficient to prove defendant’s participation or membership in a conspiracy.”);
United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 759 (7th Cir. 1988) (“‘[P]resence or a
single act will suffice if the circumstances permit the inference that the presence or
act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy.’” (quoting United States
v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir. 1978))); see also FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, instr. 5.11(a) (1999) (disallowing
convictions for mere presence at the scene of a crime or association with
participants of a crime without a showing of knowledge that the crime was being
committed).
165 See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 79 (“[W]e argue that
certain forms of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility that tolerate
a reduced mens rea should not be used in cases involving specific intent crimes
such as genocide and persecution. With respect to command responsibility, we
argue that something more than ordinary negligence should remain the
touchstone for criminal liability.”)
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such a risk may be dangerously unappreciated.166 This concern
may be particularly relevant to prosecutors attempting to have
lesser figures in the War on Terror strike deals in exchange for
implicating more senior terrorist leaders. Furthermore, even
assuming that the innocent-coercion problem noted above is not
implicated, and that the lesser figure is culpable, the problem of
overinclusiveness remains, in that it risks ensnaring those who do
not possess the requisite culpable knowledge. In the end, this
conflation could also lead to a greater exacerbation of the problem
of an overinclusive willful blindness doctrine, by creating a
slippery slope of expanding precedent. This would create the
obvious risk of an overinclusive doctrine which may punish the
guilty few but at the cost of potentially ensnaring the innocent, a
result that would be inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of
a presumption of innocence.167
In the specific context of the War on Terror, failure to
reexamine the willful blindness doctrine could thus result in an
increase in the quantity of convictions without a corresponding
increase in their qualitative legitimacy. For example, it could result
in a high rate of convictions for lower-level couriers and middlemen for terrorists, rather than higher-level terrorist leaders and
financiers. While such convictions are of course extremely
valuable in themselves,168 this result would be only loosely
166 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 694 (2006) (Thomas J.,
dissenting) (“[U]nlawful combatants, such as Hamdan, violate the law of war
merely by joining an organization, such as al Qaeda, whose principal purpose is
the killing [and] disabling . . . of peaceable citizens or soldiers.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
167 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“Constitutional
safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be
disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty.”).
168 See Amos Guiora, Using and Abusing the Financial Markets: Money
Laundering as the Achilles’ Heel of Terrorism, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 59, 60 (2007) (“There
may be hundreds of men and women willing to carry a bomb, but operationally
eliminating one of them merely makes room for another. However, only a small
number of people act as financiers of such attacks. Thus, while the use of military
and law enforcement in counterterrorism operations achieves the “on-theground” objectives of rooting out terrorists, legislators must take proactive steps
to permanently close the loopholes easily used by unscrupulous investors. Terror
financiers are fewer and further between and thus have a far greater individual
impact on terrorism themselves. Therefore, eliminating a single terror financier
will have a greater impact on preventing attacks than will merely eliminating a
few bomb-carriers. As such, the bull’s-eye of counterterrorism must be expanded
to larger concentric circles that include not only the fighters, but also those
providing material support. This discussion does not argue for the killing of such
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consistent with the stated goals of the War on Terror.169 However,
if the doctrinal underpinnings of such convictions are not properly
sound, such convictions risk exacerbating domestic and
international perception of the U.S. terror prosecution scheme as
unjustly theatrical.170
5.2. Limitations of Knowledge and Understanding by Factfinders
As previously alluded to, cultural differences between
American factfinders (civilian or military) and foreign defendants
may adversely impact understanding such defendants, and thus
adversely impact their ability to accurately determine such
defendants’ knowledge. Many scholars have characterized the
underpinnings of the War on Terror as ideological and cultural in
nature.171 Furthermore, some have specifically noted the unique
problems created by cultural and ideological differences between
the United States and Middle Easterners in the context of the War
on Terror, saying: “[Americans] certainly must understand our
own tendency to demonize . . . those of other cultural backgrounds,
religions, races, or views. . . . We have already begun to demonize
the Al Qaeda gang and the Taliban, especially those in
detention . . . .”172
financiers, but rather for an acknowledgment that these individuals must be
pursued with the same intensity as the bomb-carriers themselves.”).
169 See 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1 (“The U.S.
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism
that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this
strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path
to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with
other states, and respect for human dignity.”).
170 See generally Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When structure fails, liberty is always in peril.”);
Danner & Martinez, supra note 50, at 97 (“[P]roceedings perceived as illegitimate
are not likely to foster peace and reconciliation.”).
171 See, e.g., Robert L. Phillips, The War Against Pluralism, in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 101, 110–11 (James B. Sterba ed., 2003) (“[I]t is important to
hold before us constantly the fact that we are involved in a culture war.”); Louis P.
Pojman, The Moral Response to Terrorism and Cosmopolitanism, in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 135, 138 (James B. Sterba ed., 2003) (characterizing the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as “rooted in culture, namely a religious
worldview and practice”).
172 BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 234–35 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Naji Abi-Hashem, Peace and War in the Middle East: A Psychopolitical and
Sociocultural Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM, supra note 11, at 69, 80–85
(discussing several causes of anti-American sentiment in the Arab Islamic world,
including a perceived “Cultural and Moral Invasion”).
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This tendency to classify foreign defendants as fundamentally
different or “other” out of fear understandably may compromise
U.S. factfinders’ ability to reason fairly and objectively regarding
the defendant.173 On this issue, other scholars have identified
difficulties posed by trying potential terror defendants with value
systems radically different from typically Western values
produced as a result of such a cultural divide.174 Similar difficulties
exist in asking American factfinders to determine the boundaries of
“reasonable inferences” to be drawn from the circumstances
presented to them to establish a foreign defendant’s liability.175
Factfinders may unintentionally conflate differences in values
(specifically hostility toward America or Western values generally)
with willful blindness of or complicity in terrorist plots, resulting
in convictions for blameless defendants. This potential problem is
arguably even more pronounced in military commissions than in
U.S. domestic courts due to the fact that the defendant is often
represented by a member of the military that is prosecuting him.176
This cultural obstacle must be taken into account when

173 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 297 (“Sadly, many of us tend to distrust,
denigrate, and discriminate against those whom we perceive as being different
from us, especially if we are made to be afraid of them.”).
174 See Pojman, supra note 172, at 139 (“It is hard to reason with religious
fundamentalists, for they generally hold their faith or religious assumption to
trump what we in the West call reason. Reason, for them, always functions as a
strategy within the ‘bounds of religion alone.’” (emphasis in original));
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, in
MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 39, 47 (Berta Hernandez-Truyol ed.,
2002), available at http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/toward_multicultural
_conception_human_rights.pdf (“To understand a given culture from another . . .
may thus prove to be very difficult, if not impossible.”); see generally Fareed
Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew,
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/other/culture.html (1994) (stating of
Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew: “Part of his interest in cultural
differences is surely that they provide a coherent defense against what he sees as
Western democratic imperialism.”).
175 See De Sousa Santas, supra note 175, at 47 (arguing that the strong
rhetorical “commonplaces” of a given culture “become highly vulnerable and
problematic whenever ‘used’ in a different culture.”); see generally Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994) (stating that a jury may determine
defendant’s knowledge by “drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of
the defendant’s conduct.”).
176 See generally MCA, supra note 33, § 948k(b) (providing qualification
requirements for defense counsel, including requiring that any civilian counsel be
“otherwise qualified to practice before the military commission pursuant to
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.”).
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reconsidering the scope and application of the willful blindness
doctrine to those accused of acts of international terrorism.
To clarify, this argument does not mean to imply that
American factfinders necessarily cannot adequately evaluate the
liability of a non-American defendant. To the contrary, U.S. courts
have demonstrated their ability to do so appropriately and
effectively even in extraordinary terror cases, both before and after
the September 11th attacks. For example, in United States v.
Salameh,177 the Second Circuit in New York City engaged in a
reasoned and sophisticated review of an appeal by a key architect
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. There, the court
carefully weighed the defendant’s arguments, and ultimately
remanded him for resentencing out of concern that, as a pro se
litigant, he was arguably inadequately represented at the original
sentencing hearing.178 Similarly, in a more recent case, United
States v. Moayad,179 the Second Circuit remanded a conviction for
conspiracy to support Al Qaeda ruling that certain evidentiary and
procedural errors were committed by the lower court. That ruling
further required the case to be remanded to a different judge due
to those procedural errors.180 Regardless of the outcome of these
cases, they help demonstrate a level of procedural integrity and
institutional legitimacy in the domestic court system that many
have argued are lacking in military commissions. The more
diversified factfinders’ level of understanding, increased
procedural safeguards for the accused, and the greater opportunity
for cross-examination in domestic court trials leaves the process
with a greater chance of reflecting those goals. In the end then,
these cases help to indicate that domestic courts may be
appropriate and effective instruments for evaluating the liability of
foreign defendants, even amidst local, highly publicized,
catastrophic terror attacks.181

152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 161.
179 No. 05-4186-cr, 2008 WL 4443841 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2008); see also Benjaimin
Weiser, Appeals Court Overturns Two Terror Convictions, Citing Errors by Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at B1 (describing the ruling).
180 Weiser, supra note 180, at B1. (calling the reassignment “a highly unusual
step”).
181 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 5
(concluding that “contrary to the views of some critics, the [federal courts are]
generally well-equipped to handle most terrorism cases”).
177
178
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Rather than arguing broadly that American factfinders cannot
understand terror defendants, this Comment argues more
narrowly that the risks of convicting a defendant unjustly are
significantly higher in such cases. Specifically, the risk of a
mistaken American factfinder inferring knowledge where there is
merely culturally influenced hostility toward the prosecuting
government by the defendant contributes to the need to ensure
that procedural protections afforded to such defendants are robust.
As a result, a reexamination and narrow construal of the willful
blindness doctrine would be at least beneficial in minimizing that
risk, and thus will constitute a step toward increased legitimization
of the terror prosecution paradigm.
5.3. The Finality of Execution as Punishment
The fact that many terror convictions may result in the
execution of the accused makes these concerns particularly
poignant. It is a long established legal principle that for capital
offenses, courts are (and ought to be) even more concerned than
usual with ensuring the procedural legitimacy of the trial process.
This principle exists due to the inherent finality and inexorability
of execution as punishment—the fact that “death is different.”182
The failure of a court to employ such heightened procedural
protections risks the potential execution of an unjustly convicted
defendant. However, the risks extend more broadly to the policy
sphere as well. For example, applying the death penalty to one
convicted of acts of international terrorism after a trial where the
defendant’s presumption of innocence was compromised by
internal procedural erosions would likely be viewed as a
fundamentally unjust result by the international community.183

182 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“In capital
proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures
aspire to a heightened standard of reliability. This especial concern is a natural
consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and
unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.” (citation omitted)).
183 See POHLMAN, supra note 16, at 247 (“It was a near certainty that
international public opinion would not accept the legitimacy of a death sentence
for [convicted terror defendant Zacarias] Moussaoui if he was not permitted any
personal access to witnesses who could provide exculpable testimony on his
behalf.”); Glaberson, U.S. Said to Seek Execution for 6 in Sept. 11 Case, supra note 44,
at A1 (“Some countries have been critical of the United States’ use of the death
penalty in civilian cases, and a request for execution in the military commission
system would import much of that criticism to the already heated debates about
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Thus, with such a grave penalty hanging over the defendant,184 the
procedures followed to obtain a conviction must be held to the
strictest standards of fairness to avoid the undesirable appearance
of an unfairly vengeful adjudicative framework. One step toward
ensuring greater procedural integrity in such trials must be the
proper construal and application of mens rea requirements to
establish guilt, particularly one as potentially expansive as willful
blindness.
5.4. Threats of Coercion
Misapplication of the use of willful blindness as a theory of
knowledge could be used to prosecute and convict guilty lesser
terrorist figures to inculpate larger terrorist figures. At worst, the
intentional misuse of the willful blindness doctrine (playing on the
likelihood of juries to misunderstand it) could be used as a device
by zealous prosecutors to threaten or coerce innocent detainees to
inculpate others, regardless of the truth of that inculpation. These
kinds of coercion, even if theoretical, could be used by prosecutors
to pressure defendants into either false guilty pleas or into falsely
inculpating other figures to escape punishment. Either falsified
result is undesirable from a legal or policy standpoint.
Intentional coercion is, of course, contrary to both U.S.
domestic law185 and international law.186 Despite the United States’
the legitimacy of Guantánamo and the Bush administration’s legal approach
there, some lawyers said.”).
184 See generally POHLMAN, supra note 16, at 197 (quoting Judge Gregory in a
June 3, 2003 CIPA proceeding regarding accused terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui as
saying “[The] sword of Damocles is over . . . [his] head . . . .”).
185 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1589 (2006) (criminalizing obtaining “the labor or
services of a person by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against,
that person or another person; by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended
to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical
restraint; or by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal
process”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 872 (2006) (criminalizing extortion by officers or
employees of the United States); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No
person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”);
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce
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oft-invoked assertion that the Geneva Conventions do not (or
should not) apply to detainees,187 such coercion, if utilized, could
A
violate the Conventions’ prohibition on the same.188
reexamination of the willful blindness doctrine and its more
carefully narrowed application would be a step toward combating
such potential coercion operating on those accused of acts of
international terrorism. Such a reexamination would also thus
serve the goals of improving the perceived legitimacy of the U.S.
terror prosecution paradigm as a whole.
5.5. Critical Responses
Critics may argue that reform of willful blindness has little
relevance to the War on Terror. Such critics would argue that it is
unclear that willful blindness plays a central role in terror trials in
domestic courts or in military commissions, and that military
commissions are so infrequently actually used as to render them
less germane to the discussion. Such critics may specifically point
to the recent military commission ruling in United States v. Hamdan,
in which Osama bin Laden’s former driver was convicted of
supporting terrorism, but was acquitted of the more serious charge
of conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks.189 Such critics thus may
suggest that this Comment’s call for reform of the willful blindness
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
186 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 20, art. 99 (“No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a
prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which
he is accused.”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, supra note 20, art. 31 (“No physical or moral coercion shall be
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them
or from third parties.”).
187 See Cheney remarks, supra note 21 (describing Vice President Cheney’s
contention that detainees are not “prisoners of war” and thus do not receive the
same guarantees and safeguards).
188 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 20, art. 99 (“No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a
prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which
he is accused.”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, supra note 20, art. 31 (“No physical or moral coercion shall be
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them
or from third parties.”).
189 Jess Bravin, Bin Laden Ex-Driver is Convicted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2008,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121802824878616731.html.
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doctrine is overblown, in light of the fact that both domestic courts
and military commissions have demonstrated their ability to
adjudicate such cases fairly, and properly attribute the appropriate
degree of culpable knowledge to terror defendants.
Regarding these criticisms, the argument presented in this
Comment points to a widely critiqued problem of confusion and
overbreadth in the willful blindness doctrine. While it would be
unrealistic to assume that this problem infects only cases dealing
with non-terror related subjects, even if that were true, the problem
would still reflect one that looms with special implications for
terror defendants. In addition, while military commissions have
been infrequently used, the doctrinal problem at least runs the
serious risk of infecting both the domestic court system and
military commissions. In short, the argument made in this
Comment does not say that courts cannot reflect a clear willful
blindness jurisprudence, but rather that the confusion and
complexity that has infected that jurisprudence makes it
unreasonably difficult for them to do so. That complexity should
be reduced with a clearer explication of the criteria and limitations
of the doctrine going forward.
Critics may also argue that strong policy reasons exist to apply
the willful blindness doctrine liberally to terror defendants. The
principal argument for such critics would likely be that willful
blindness is a proper legal doctrine, and limiting it would create a
grave threat of terrorists closing their eyes to avoid liability in case
of prosecution. However, such views mistake the nature of the
problem. As this Comment has argued, the proper use of willful
blindness doctrine would be an invaluable tool to effectively
capture and convict those who deliberately avoid inculpatory
knowledge.
Properly applied, the doctrine is effective in
convicting those who act willfully, as it was intended to do.
However, the critics’ argument fails to consider the problems
caused by misuse of the willful blindness doctrine to punish those
who do not act willfully. As this Comment has argued, neither the
goals of the War on Terror nor the foreign policy goals of the
United States are served by the conviction of innocent defendants.
To that end, a reexamination of the willful blindness doctrine is
necessary to prevent the misuse of the doctrine to convict
defendants who do not act with the requisite knowledge to satisfy
the charges against them.
Similarly, critics may argue more broadly on utilitarian
grounds that, even if the willful blindness doctrine is improperly
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applied, that the exigencies of the threats posed by international
terrorism more than outweigh any comparatively academic
concerns of procedural impropriety. Such a view has been
suggested indirectly by several governmental officials and judicial
opinions.190 However, without addressing the claims of ongoing
exigency or the severity of such an ongoing threat, there are strong
grounds to disagree with the view that any such exigency justifies
a procedural abrogation of the nature discussed above. The
deprioritization of the protections afforded by legal procedure is a
disfavored response to exigent circumstances. While examples of
such erosions of procedural protections abound in American
history,191 such reactionary measures have required a strict
showing of necessity.192 Contrarily, where such necessity has not

190 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (“[W]e will continue to take all necessary
measures to protect our national and economic security . . . .”); John Yoo & Eric
Posner, Editorial, The Patriot Act Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at A26
(“[S]ome think that even a small restriction of civil liberties can never be justified.
These people think that, as a mark of our commitment to freedom, courts should
not allow the government to invade our civil liberties even during emergencies.
The truth is the opposite. . . . [F]ear provoked by emergency also can motivate
government to react to new threats in creative ways. . . . Errors may occur, but
they happen during peacetime as well as during emergencies.”); see generally
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia J., dissenting) (arguing
that “The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the Nation’s
Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly
cause more Americans to be killed. . . . In the long term, then, the Court’s decision
today accomplishes little, except perhaps to reduce the well-being of enemy
combatants that the Court ostensibly seeks to protect. In the short term, however,
the decision is devastating.”).
191 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944)
(upholding detention of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in light of a
military claim of necessity).
192 See, e.g., id. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence
of such restrictions . . . .”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139–40 (1866) (“Congress
cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander
under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and
punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a
controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, or at least insures acts of
indemnity from the justice of the legislature.”); see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 369 (1980) (“[T]he concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has
a dangerous plasticity. Because they invariably have the visage of overriding
importance, there is always a temptation to invoke security ‘necessities’ to justify

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/6

2008]

WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE

747

been demonstrated, the deprioritization of legal procedure in favor
of the erosion of civil liberties has been harshly denounced.193 In
either event, such erosions are justifiable, if at all, only for the
duration of the exigent circumstances.194 Finally, even where
necessity was demonstrated in particular cases, later courts have
sometimes condemned the erosions of civil liberties enacted under
such claimed necessity as anachronistic.195 Similarly, here, it is
difficult to conceive of valid arguments for justifying an adherence
to and misapplication of the willful blindness doctrine in the name
of exigency. This is true particularly in the context of detainees,
where flaws and limitations of the current doctrine render it an
unduly blunt tool for achieving justice.
Thus, in short, utilitarian arguments should not persuade us to
rationalize the misuse and misapplication of legal doctrine at the
expense of a defendants’ presumption of innocence. Countless
legal avenues exist to convict accused terrorists of existing crimes
without resorting to an overbroad misusage of willful blindness to
achieve the same result. The current overbreadth of the willful
blindness doctrine threatens the conviction of innocent defendants,
potentially undermining the legitimacy of the United States’ legal
process, and thus risks undermining the political standing of the
an encroachment upon civil liberties. For that reason, the military-security
argument must be approached with a healthy skepticism . . . .”).
193 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 612 (2006) (finding that the
government failed to satisfy the “most basic precondition” of military necessity
for permitting the use of trial by military commission).
194 See id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where, as here, no emergency
prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation
does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic
means—how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic
means. Our Court today simply does the same.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]n
emergency power of necessity must at least be limited by the emergency . . . .”);
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (“As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for,
if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross
usurpation of power.”).
195 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Calif. 1984)
(granting writ of coram nobis, stating: “Korematsu remains on the pages of our
legal and political history. As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having
very limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution
that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant
in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of
distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to
protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability.”).
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United States in the international community. To correct that
problem, reform of the willful blindness doctrine is both necessary
and desirable to further the United States’ legitimate legal and
policy goals.
5.5.1.

Regarding Practicality

Critics may argue that a proposed reexamination of the willful
blindness doctrine is overly idealistic, and unlikely to have
practical effect in light of the many pressures facing prosecutors
engaged in international terrorism trials. Of course, such pressures
are both real and numerous. Critics will argue that prosecutors of
alleged terrorists are likely to view their duty as one of protecting
lives and protecting the health of the nation.196 As a result,
prosecutors of that mindset are unlikely to view with favor a
perceived limitation on their authority or discretion. In addition,
critics would argue that personal, financial, and political pressure
to win may trump the interest to follow perceived limited
procedural restraints.
Despite these pressures however, several countervailing
interests support a reexamination or limitation on the application
of the willful blindness doctrine in the context of international
terrorism trials. Most importantly, prosecutors and governments
are under legal and ethical duties to apply the law both zealously
and properly. While some may argue that the high-stakes nature
of international terrorism trials may justify or necessitate a more
zealous and expansive prosecutorial demeanor,197 such arguments
should be resisted. Rather, this Comment argues that the
196 Many politicians encouraged such a view after the September 11th attacks,
stressing the desire to use any means necessary to capture and prosecute alleged
terrorists. See Newsmax.com Wires, supra note 2 (quoting then Attorney General
John Ashcroft: “Let the terrorists among us be warned . . . . We will seek every
prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under
the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.”). Ironically,
some framed such views in the language of willful blindness. See Associated
Press, President Urges Renewal of Patriot Act, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-17-bush-terrorism_x.htm
(quoting President Bush’s April 17, 2004 radio address as stating “To abandon the
Patriot Act would deprive law enforcement and intelligence officers of needed
tools in the war on terror, and demonstrate willful blindness to a continuing
threat.”).
197 See Yoo & Posner, supra note 191 (arguing in part that certain emergencies
justify a curtailment of civil rights and a more aggressive prosecutorial scheme to
combat such emergencies).
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protections afforded by the law exist to provide a procedural
framework by which proper prosecutions must occur, including
those which occur under extreme circumstances.198 Adhering to
such a procedural framework may reinforce the legitimacy of such
prosecutions, a result that could resonate socially, politically, and
ideologically in the United States and abroad.199
6.

CONCLUSION

The willful blindness doctrine is a central point on which to
focus the debate between advocates of the potentially competing
values of civil rights and national security in the context of the War
on Terror. When properly construed and applied, the willful
blindness doctrine is an invaluable tool for establishing the
culpable knowledge and liability of a defendant, regardless of the
context. However, when improperly extended or applied, the
willful blindness doctrine presents serious potential dangers of
overinclusiveness, illegitimacy, and coercion, to name a few.
Practical applications of the doctrine and its extensions have
demonstrated these dangers in both domestic and international
fora.
These dangers take on particular significance in the context of
the doctrine’s use against those accused of acts of international
terrorism. As such, it is important for courts and tribunals to
reexamine both the wording of willful blindness instructions to
198 See Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 415–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“It is the
judiciary’s independent function to uphold the Constitution even if to do so may
mean curtailing Congress’s efforts to confer greater freedom on the executive to
investigate national security threats.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (“The Founders of this Nation entrusted the
lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”); see
generally HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel
[1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, reprinted in ISRAEL LAW REPORTS: 1998-1999 at 567, 605 (Sari
Bashi ed., Nevo Press Ltd. 2004), available at http://www.hamoked.org.il/
items/260_eng.pdf (“Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand.”). But see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
723 (Thomas J., dissenting) (“[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than
the security of the Nation . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
199 See generally Rosemary Foot, Human Rights in Conflict, 48 SURVIVAL 109,
115–21 (2006) (arguing in part that increases in transparency and accountability
will improve the perceived legitimacy of the United States’ terror prosecution
scheme, benefitting the United States politically, morally, and in terms of national
security, concluding: “The exercise of power in the absence of legitimacy is
extraordinarily wasteful of resources and unlikely to achieve desired outcomes in
the long term.”).
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factfinders, and to apply the doctrine properly, in order to
reinforce the legitimacy of the legal process itself. This kind of
reexamination will serve multiple important interests, the most
salient of which being enhancing the legitimacy of the means used
and the ends pursued in the U.S.-led War on Terror. Such
improvements may also promote the improved political perception
of the United States abroad, by demonstrating that prosecutions of
those accused of international terrorism are guided (and restricted)
by proper applications of established rules of law.
Broadly speaking, prioritizing procedural fairness used in
terror prosecutions in the War on Terror would benefit the United
States in numerous ways. Politically, it would reinforce the
integrity of the U.S. legal system and terror prosecution paradigm,
leading other nations to cooperate more readily in bringing
terrorists to justice. Ideologically, it would reestablish a convincing
moral sense of leadership and noble purposes, leading other
governments to support (or at least not oppose) the United States
on some moral grounds. Socially, it would refortify the public’s
confidence in the U.S. legal system, leading the public to support
both the War on Terror’s means and ends. While reexamining the
willful blindness doctrine of course could not accomplish all of
these goals alone, doing so nonetheless would be a small but
valuable step toward strengthening the procedural integrity of our
legal system. In doing so, this step forward would serve the
interests of civil rights and national security, thus furthering both
the goals of the War on Terror and a broader sense of justice.
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